The Great Balancing Act: Greater Eurasia’s path to stability
In Greater Eurasia, we are witnessing the most striking competition between two fundamental models of interstate relations: cooperation, exemplified by regional institutions and platforms, and competition, driven by the global economy and politics still dominated by the West. This dynamic defines the opportunities and challenges facing Russia’s policy in this direction as we approach 2025.
In the years to come, the region will continue to balance its natural desire for common development with the disruptive impact of global disintegration processes. Two critical factors shape this balance. First, states in Greater Eurasia are focused on achieving their national development goals. Second, the region’s central position in world politics and economics makes its development inseparable from broader global trends.
As the international order moves toward a state of comparative equilibrium, challenges and tests will inevitably arise for states in Greater Eurasia. Nevertheless, the long-term effect of this process could be positive, potentially creating conditions where cooperation becomes the dominant trend in interstate relations. Despite the difficulties of today, this offers cautious optimism for the future of this part of the world.
Cooperation in Greater Eurasia
In Greater Eurasia, cooperation manifests through initiatives and organizations that, by design, resist domination by a single power or small group of states. Over the past decades, the emergence of such institutions has been a clear achievement. They reflect a shared commitment to security and stability through collaboration with neighbors.
Unlike other parts of the world, Greater Eurasia lacks clear dividing lines between economic or military-political blocs. The China and Russia-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has emerged as a particularly ambitious and inclusive platform. It offers a foundation for building a relatively equitable regional order in the long term.
However, the realities of global competition complicate these cooperative aspirations. Most states in Greater Eurasia are deeply integrated into the existing global economic system. While this connection supports their development, it also exposes them to systemic vulnerabilities: economic disparities, the politicization of economic processes, and growing competition for dwindling global resources.
This creates a paradox. When countries in Greater Eurasia seek to cooperate with one another, they also compete within a global system dominated by the West. This tension affects small states and major powers alike, including China and India. The region thus embodies a vivid rivalry between the two models of interstate relations — cooperation within regional frameworks and competition in global arenas.
Challenges to regional integration
Practical cooperation among Greater Eurasian states is hindered by the absence of a unifying leader or institution. Unlike the West, which operates under the leadership of the US, Greater Eurasia has no comparable central authority. While China is a candidate for such a role, it lacks the political will and resources to dominate the region. Moreover, China’s ambitions are effectively balanced by Russia, India, and smaller powers that pursue independent foreign policies.
As a result, Greater Eurasia cannot build its regional order around a single institution or framework with binding mandates. However, it is noteworthy that no major country in the region has sacrificed cooperation with its neighbors to pursue extra-regional alliances. Even India, despite its growing partnership with Washington, maintains its system of relations with Eurasian neighbors. This is further evident in the way India and China manage their bilateral ties independently of their global commitments.
Recent events on the periphery of Greater Eurasia, such as in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, add complexity to the region’s development. In the Middle East, the balance of power is undergoing significant shifts, particularly due to Israel’s military and diplomatic pressure on Arab states and Iran, with full Western backing. These tensions threaten the stability of major regional powers like Iran and could spill over into Greater Eurasia.
In Southeast Asia, the weakening of ASEAN and the intensifying rivalry between China and the Philippines highlights growing instability. Similarly, Northeast Asia faces rising tensions, with Japan and South Korea acting as extensions of US influence. These peripheral zones are increasingly factors of instability that hinder Greater Eurasia’s internal stabilization. However, they cannot be ignored, as they are tied to the region by geography, economic integration, and human connections.
Looking ahead
The challenges facing Greater Eurasia highlight the difficulty of pursuing a unified regional strategy. Nevertheless, the states here have so far managed to navigate these complexities without sacrificing cooperation. This cautious optimism is a testament to the resilience of institutions like the SCO and the commitment of Eurasian states to preserving stability.
As Russia looks ahead to 2025, it must consider how to strengthen its role in Greater Eurasia while addressing the impact of global and peripheral instabilities. The future of this vast region will depend on its ability to balance cooperation and competition in a world undergoing profound transformation.
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