It’s Time to Rethink DoD’s Civil Harm Mitigation and Response
When catastrophic failures occur in the federal government, elected or politically appointed executives frequently create ‘patchwork structures’ for solutions. The federal government is addicted to adding structures and funding to solve problems. Rather than fixing accountability where the failures occur and then implementing reforms, they create new umbrella organizations to oversee the failed function or capability. For example, after the intelligence failures leading to 9-11, the Bush administration created a new bureaucracy, the Director of National Intelligence. Adding structures, personnel, and funding does not inherently fix problems. Rather, it can create uncertainty in roles and responsibilities and further obfuscate accountability. Repairing and rehabilitating existing capabilities with new plans, policies, and programs is, arguably, a more efficient remedy. As physicist Ernest Rutherford famously stated, ‘Gentlemen we’ve run out of money, so now we have to think.’
The latest example of this dynamic is the Department of Defense’s (DoD) nascent initiative for Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR). Protecting civilians in military operations is vital to the U.S.’s national security. It is a codified requirement in international and U.S. law and in DoD policies starting with Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components . Beyond the legal requirements, protecting civilians is essential to maintain the credibility the U.S. Armed Forces and the legitimacy of their missions. The CHMR plan highlights the function “is not only a moral imperative, it is also critical to achieving long-term success on the battlefield.”
In response to public criticism over targeting practices and civilian casualties, DoD embarked on ways to improve the protection and consideration of civilians. The Department developed a new program that will invest hundreds, if not thousands, of new positions and new resources into Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR). This includes establishing a new Center of Excellence and adding civilian positions throughout the Department, the Services, and all the Joint Combatant and Functional Commands.
The normal process for determining required capabilities in DoD is defined in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). A sponsor, usually a proponent or a Center of Excellence, conducts a Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) to determine the required capabilities in a function, such as mitigating and preventing harm to foreign civilian populations in military operations. The study uses analytical rigor to determine if capability gaps exist in existing capabilities or future requirements. The study should also identify any capabilities with overlaps or redundancies to streamline the function. The final output of the CBA are recommendations for changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTmLPF-P) for programs not requiring materiel (new acquisitions program) solutions. The change recommendations are presented to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for validation.
Mitigating or preventing harm to civilians in military operations is not a new concept. Instead of using JCIDS to look at this function, the DoD used its modus operandi to create a ‘patchwork structure’ to solve a problem the U.S. military has developed solutions for throughout the past two-hundred years. The U.S. military was the progenitor of protecting civilians starting with the General Orders No. 100, Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code) during the American Civil War. Written by Francis Lieber and promulgated by President Abraham Lincoln, the code established the required command responsibilities for the treatment of civilians in the occupied South. Lieber, an attorney and immigrant understood the how the horrors of war affect civilian populations since he witnessed it as a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars. Within the next fifty years, the Lieber Code served as a starting point for the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.
As World War II loomed, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall recognized the need for a capability solely focused on foreign civilian populations and the occupation of conquered territory. Marshall understood the requirements of protecting civilians and preventing their interference in military operations. He served as a Second Lieutenant in the Army’s 30th Infantry Regiment during the turbulent counterinsurgency in the Philippine Insurrection. After World War I, he served in the U.S. Army’s military occupation of the Rhineland. Marshall, seeing the requirements in a global conflict, directed the establishment of the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia in May 1942 to train civil affairs and military government personnel for the war.
Since World War II, Civil Affairs (CA) has stood as the Department of Defense’s lone capability focused solely on foreign civilian populations. If there is fault in the Department’s ability to accurately understand foreign populations and the impacts of U.S. military operations among them, then it is a failure of the Department’s CA capabilities. Specifically, it is a failure of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Department of the Army (DA). DoDD 5100.01 directs both USSOCOM and DA to conduct Civil Affairs Operations for the joint force.
The failure to conduct a CBA to look at existing capabilities within DoD before going to organizational models is emblematic of government waste and breeds inefficiencies. Instead of studying where system failures occur in considering foreign civilian populations, DoD implemented organizational and personnel solutions without identifying overlaps and redundancies. DA is currently cutting Regular Army CA positions to provide staff support to corps and division headquarters, while DoD is adding hundreds of Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and at multiple Flag Officer organizations including Combatant Commands and Functional Commands. Some of these Commands already have uniformed and civilian FTEs assigned in CA roles and functions.
In an even greater example of wasting resources, is the creation of Civil Protection (CP) Center of Excellence (CoE) (CP CoE) to serve as the proponent for CHMR and “expedite and institutionalize the advancement of knowledge, practice, and tools for preventing, mitigating, and responding to civilian harm.” According the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response – Action Plan (CHMR-AP), the CP CoE will provide “direct support to operational commands” as well as “support policy, doctrine, and force development” and finally conduct “research and analysis.”
As currently conceived, the CHMR concept and its CoE is duplicative of existing capabilities in DoD. The joint and Army proponent for stability is the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. They serve as the proponent for the publication of Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, Joint Stabilization Activities and the Army’s Field Manual 3-07, Stability. USSOCOM is the Joint proponent for Civil Affairs forces and publishes JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. The U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), under the United States Special Operations Command (USASOC), is the Army proponent for Civil Affairs forces and publishes FM 3-57, Civil Affairs. Finally, JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting, directs “all members of DoD components to comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts.” It directs Commanders to “act consistent with the…the principles of military necessity, humanity, distinction, proportionality, and honor.”
How is the CHMR concept distinct from current capabilities that focus on the law of warfare, stability, civil-military operations, and civil affairs? What unique DOTmLPF-P recommendations, beyond simply adding new positions, does the CHMR concept provide to commanders and warfighters? When staff planning is required at a joint or service headquarters for operations, who provides input to commanders on civil considerations? Arguably, this presents the potential to simply add more confusion to commanders and their staffs in an already overlooked aspect of warfare.
Recommendations
The incoming Secretary of Defense should immediately pause the implementation of CHMR pending further review and analysis. He should direct the development of a concept outlining the required capabilities and capacities to address this function. Finally, DoD should conduct a Joint Capabilities Based Assessment to reform and rehabilitate existing capabilities with DOTmLPF-P recommendations and determine the need for new capabilities and programs. The CBA should start with all joint force capabilities with primary or secondary roles to protect civilian populations in military operations. While CA is an obvious capability involved in this, the CBA should look at the roles of Judge Advocate General, Military Police, and any capability involved in joint targeting.
Senior advocacy for the consideration of civilians in military operations is needed. Often in the U.S. military, this function is viewed as separate from warfare instead of a natural component of it. Two decades of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism created a hangover effect for DoD and the services. Historically these operations have produced a “backlash” and public sentiments of “never again.” Yet over the past two centuries, the U.S. found itself in dozens of military operations requiring stabilization and even occupation.
Future conflicts will occur amongst civilian populations and the DoD needs to prepare the joint force for this. Simply adding a new concept, without defining its dependencies and connections with the existing force simply creates more confusion and complication. Failing to apply DOTmLPF-P corrections to existing forces before layering more positions and concepts on top of it will prove counter-effective to the overall intent.
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