Security and Sanctions in Post-Assad Syria
After the collapse of the Assad regime, the current sanctions laws are in desperate need of reform. The Syrian people have long suffered from the effects of blanket economic restrictions that crippled the economy and gave rise to widespread black-market activity and cronyism. The broken licensure system hindered humanitarian operations and paralyzed essential infrastructure in the energy, health, and education sectors. At the same time, targeted sanctions, colloquially known as “smart” sanctions, were actively evaded using a complex network of shells that Assad publicly boasted about for years.
World leaders—particularly in the United States and Europe—should devise a sanctions reform strategy to address these issues. The U.S. Treasury’s issuing of General License 24 (GL 24) is a first step towards reforming sanctions, signaling to regional partners and Syrians a shift in policy while supporting the reconstruction of Syria post-Assad. For the incoming Trump administration, it is key to any new Middle East security architecture, especially as the outgoing administration expands its military footprint through Operation Inherent Resolve, which has long followed a misguided “by, with, and through” defense policy in Syria and Iraq.
Sectoral, Targeted, And Terrorism Sanctions On Syria
The Assad regime was one of the first members of President Jimmy Carter’s list of states sponsoring terrorism published in 1979. However, it was not until the Syria Accountability Act of 2003 that Washington ramped up sectoral sanctions. With Assad’s intransigence and continued regional destabilization, the Bush administration issued executive orders that extended export controls to cover the transportation, banking, and telecommunications sectors. This included listing the Commercial Bank of Syria as a primary money laundering entity, bringing correspondent banks and Exim operations to a halt. Executive Orders 13441 and 13460 reinforced these initial sanctions, leading to a first wave of capital flight and foreign direct investment.
As the Syrian uprising spread in 2011, the scope of trade restrictions expanded to include the central bank and energy sector, forcing foreign firms to declare force majeure and halt production-sharing agreements. Those contracts were a major source of ill-gotten gains as Assad’s investment funds, like Al-Mashreq, were actively used to divert oil revenue and enrich his family. The regime’s persistent collocation of its criminal regional enterprise to official government institutions resulted in a complex web of export controls under the broad aegis of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the National Emergencies Act. In 2017, the U.S. Congress introduced the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which aimed at protecting civilians from Assad’s criminal enterprise.
A deluge of terrorism-related sanctions has also applied to multiple military factions in Syria since 2012. Some of the designations are multilateral, issued by the United Nations Security Council, such as Resolution 2253. Others are unilateral U.S. designations under the authority of Executive Order 13224, such as the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation for entities and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) for individuals—including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa. Notably, GL 24 draws a thin line authorizing HTS-related transactions for public services while banning military transactions.
In general, terrorism sanctions require an audit and a potential remedy through a step-for-step model. As the designations are aimed at national security, they should not be extended to the Syrian economy at large, nor should they constitute a barrier to the express issuance of sanctions waivers.
Biden’s Legacy In Syria
Historically, the Biden administration did not ramp up pressure against the regime and signaled that sanctions are reversible. According to sources who spoke on background, Biden’s National Security Council (NSC) actively blocked reform to Syria sanctions by pressuring Congress to freeze all Syria-related bills, especially in 2024. The subsequent delays in the U.S. Congress to update and advance Syria legislation caused friction in the bipartisan agreement against the Assad regime.
The administration did not enforce multiple bills that had passed through previous National Defense Authorization Acts. Officials also ignored existing IEEPA law requiring sanctions evaders to face civil or criminal penalties. As a result, Assad hid his assets as the Ultimate Beneficiary Owner, using nominee shareholders to pierce the U.N. procurement system and buy time for the ten-year sunset clause on penalties to lapse. It took two years for the U.S. treasury to close the controversial 50 percent loophole that Bashar al-Assad’s wife, Asma, abused.
On Captagon, Secretary Blinken deflected requests to designate the regime as a major illicit producer and transit state despite the large body of evidence. The designation would have stripped Assad of revenue, stopped him from procuring precursor chemicals, and given jurisdiction to the U.S. judiciary and Drug Enforcement Agency. The U.S. Department of State also missed an opportunity to reveal Assad’s net worth by limiting its reporting to open-source information. The State Department’s Office of Sanction Coordination hesitated on the Arab gas project and sent mixed messages until it was stalled. Ultimately, regional geopolitics focused on flawed security considerations dominated U.S. Syria policy every time.
On Caesar, the White House has been treading water in reform and renewal. The Caesar code goes well beyond sanctions, requiring accountability and elimination of chemical weapons. It contains economic recovery provisions that facilitate USAID assistance. Hence, it represents a roadmap for transitional justice supported by Syrians. After the collapse of the regime, Caesar’s secondary sanctions are effectively moot as the extraterritorial reach to deter Assad’s re-normalization is no longer applicable. In addition, the names of regime war criminals need an update and expansion as part of a broad legal redefinition of the government of Syria.
The Urgent Need For Licensure Reform
Despite the embedded exemption for non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the scope of the authorization is limited. While GL 24 authorizes energy-related transactions essential to early recovery, it is limited to donations and requires special licenses for commercial exports. Hence, the current Export Administration Regulations (EARs) enforced by the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) still constitute a significant barrier to stabilization and reconstruction.
A series of waivers are necessary for NGOs to achieve aid localization and overcome procurement hurdles. According to humanitarian stakeholders, the World Health Organisation, and the United Nations, the situation in Syria is dire. Hence, the general license was warranted and supported by precedent. It will help reverse derisking and overcome ambiguous compliance issues, especially as humanitarian organizations are often stretched in human resources and face clearance hurdles that delay their operations. That said, it is not a perfect or permanent solution.
Wider sanctions reform serves multiple purposes. First, it alleviates the compliance concerns of regional states and companies for an emergency crisis response. Second, it allows USAID to increase its assistance to the Syria Recovery Trust Fund and provide paired expertise for capacity building. This would help implement vital International Humanitarian Law modalities like Cash and Voucher Assistance for Internally Displaced Persons. Third, it would align the U.S. policy stance with regional and international partners who signaled their readiness for speedy humanitarian assistance at scale.
Ultimately, the warped worldviews held by the White House NSC, colored by frustrations from the Obama era, complicated the Syria crisis and prolonged Assad’s control. The incoming Trump administration is left with the tall task of sanctions reform. This will entail restructuring the U.S. deployment in Syria and Iraq, as well as redefining the legal definition of the government of Syria under ambiguous circumstances. However, before embarking on such a wide regional realignment, an urgent disaster response is needed from the United States and the West, given their roles as the largest humanitarian donors to Syria.
Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him on X: @langloisajl.
Abed Al-Thalji is a policy analyst focused on Sanctions & Foreign Affairs. He holds an MSc. in International Trade from Gothenburg University’s School of Business, Economics, and Law.
Image: Shutterstock.com.