I worked at Boeing for over 30 years. I witnessed the fallout of outsourcing firsthand.

• Manufacturing engineer Douglas Dorsey started working at Boeing in 1984 and retired in 2017.
• Dorsey worked on the Boeing 777 and 787 Dreamliner, where he said things began to unravel.
• He reflects on his time on the shop floor and how Boeing plans to repair its reputation.

This as-told-to essay is based on a transcribed conversation with Douglas Dorsey, from Washington, about his career as a manufacturing engineer at Boeing. The following has been edited for length and clarity.

I started my career at Boeing in 1984, and I worked there for over 30 years.

I was a manufacturing engineer. My responsibilities included writing instructions and coming up with assembly sequences for aircraft.

During my career, I worked on several aircraft projects for Boeing, including the Advanced Tactical Fighter program, the Boeing 777, and the 787 Dreamliner. It was always interesting and challenging. I worked with dedicated employees and on cutting-edge programs.

I retired in 2017 feeling proud to have worked there. I was a "lifer" with Boeing blue blood running through my veins.

However, while working on the Boeing 787 program in the 2000s, I noticed that outsourcing manufacturing tasks to suppliers became a really big problem for Boeing. When I worked on the shop floor, I saw the negative impacts of outsourcing to suppliers, such as slower production and delivering incomplete parts.

Even after retiring, I've stayed up to date with Boeing. I've followed the news on malfunctions and strikes, but I think management is taking baby steps in the right direction.

I saw chaos unfold at Boeing due to mismanagement and outsourcing

During the good old days, I had a positive opinion of Boeing. In my first decade at the company, the chain of command was clear. You knew what your job responsibilities were and could count on your line managers. Most importantly, there was no drama with executives, and we had confidence in those in command.

But in 1997, upper management was thrown into chaos when Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglas, with McDonnell Douglas executives taking top positions at Boeing. Harry Stonecipher, who was briefly Boeing's CEO, resigned in 2005 after he was found having an affair with an employee.

It was like a corporate soap opera played out in the media. As an employee, the news was distracting and felt like evidence of the level of disorder at the top of the company.

At the same time, the Boeing 787 program was underway. The 787 was launched as a complete departure from how Boeing airplanes had traditionally been constructed. To reduce the time from program launch to when the planes were in service, Boeing would have "risk-sharing partners" deliver complete aircraft sections to the final assembly site.

787 program managers and employees implicitly understood this new production method, and we cautiously believed it might work. But it began to unravel bit by bit and ended in a three-year delay.

I wondered why we were accepting substandard work on 787

I was a project manufacturing engineer for the 787, creating work instructions, and a liaison manufacturing engineer, working on the shop floor to resolve issues with existing work instructions.

At the beginning of each new airplane program, program leadership and supply chain management divided major sections of the aircraft among various subcontractors, suppliers, and risk-sharing "partners." When suppliers were late in delivering their components or delivered them incomplete, this became "traveled work," which had to be completed by Boeing employees during final assembly.

I spent much of my time on the program trying to accommodate parts that had a "non-conformance" tag on them and had to be reworked and installed into the build.

I wondered what was going on and why we were accepting substandard, incomplete work.

As an engineer, I wasn't privy to the decisions going on in the upper chambers of management, but I could see the chaos filtering down. It felt like the company wasn't listening to its mechanics about how to improve processes.

I remember group meetings where employees, including myself, questioned decisions by management and offered constructive criticism that was politely but bluntly blown off.

The 787 was sadly delayed three years.

Confusing supply chains seem to still cause problems

Earlier this year, there was an incident with a Boeing 737 Max plane, where a door plug blew out after take off.

Although I retired in 2017, I think this was caused by mismanagement of traveled repair work. The plug door was manufactured by Spirit AeroSystems, a Boeing subsidiary that was sold off in 2005.

An investigation found that because the part 737MAX9 fuselage is shipped in whole, mechanics at Boeing rarely work on the plug doors. When the plug door frame had to be repaired and the plug door replaced, two separate groups of mechanics working on the door made mistakes.

As a result, a plug door malfunctioned, and Boeing's reputation was damaged alongside it, causing the FAA to increase its oversight of 737MAX9 planes' production processes.

It's always disappointing when the company you worked for makes major news headlines for a mistake. However, it doesn't change my general opinion of Boeing. I know there are many dedicated employees who are committed to doing their jobs properly and safely.

Boeing is taking baby steps in the right direction

I still know some Boeing employees and followed the recent strike. I think employees have gotten a good package, but they didn't get a return to the legacy defined-benefit pension plan. When I retired, I still benefited from the traditional pension plan and also had a 401(k).

Back in 2014, Boeing promised employees that they'd build the 777-9 in Washington. Part of the strike package is also building the next new plane in Washington. These promises show that Boeing management is waking up to the matter of outsourcing.

Boeing is also bringing Spirit AeroSystems, which it sold in 2005, back in-house. All the workers will be merged back under one camp.

The lines of communication between two in-house teams are often simpler and more direct than with a supplier. When I was on the 777 program in the 1990s, I would call my counterparts at the Wichita site to resolve issues and exchange information. I couldn't do this with a supplier because all communication had to be through supply chain management.

I think this shows Boeing acknowledging it went down a bad path when it sold the supplier.

I see these actions as baby steps in the right direction. Kelly Ortberg, Boeing's CEO, is trying to steer the company on a new course, but I think it's going to take a long time.

Editor's note: In response to Business a request for comment from Business Insider, a Boeing spokesperson highlighted remarks by CEO Kelly Ortberg during the company's third quarter report:

"Much has been written about how we got to where we are, but most also recognize that Boeing was once a benchmark for what good culture looks like. And I believe we can return to that legacy. I know culture change starts at the top. Our leaders, from me on down, need to be closely integrated with our business and the people who are doing the design and production of our products. We need to be on the factory floors, in the back shops, and in our engineering labs. We need to know what's going on, not only with our products but with our people."