The Conservatives have had a terrible few years – these are the three first steps to recovery in 2025

The Conservatives have faced a number of crises since emerging as one of the largest parties in British politics. These crises, which are well documented and analysed by historians of the party, were overcome with strong leadership, determination to shake off the pressures from outside, or ruthless determination to survive, no matter the odds.

Longevity, for the party, has been enabled by a clear survival instinct, which immediately points to solutions for problems. For example, the removal of Iain Duncan Smith from the leadership in 2003 was a reaction to both the evidence of declining support and his own failure to craft a narrative of success.

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The battles of the past tell us today that the Conservatives do not want to fade away. But then few parties want to disappear. The Liberals did not decline to virtually nothing by choice. Nor did the SDP, when they made their Limehouse Declaration, intend to vanish by the end of the 1980s.

Today, the Conservatives want to survive. However, they are diminished and face pressures that will hinder attempts to renew and reinvigorate. So, how are the Conservatives going to recover? What can new leader Kemi Badenoch do to lead them out of the night and into the day?

After the results of the 2024 election, the party has fewer foot soldiers on the ground at local level willing (or available) to canvas. It is harmed by a small but punchy Reform UK, which is targeting the Conservatives on their traditional rhetorical issues. And there appears to be a substantial gap between voters and the Conservatives on a number of core issues, including values as well as policy, particularly among some younger voters who don’t feel represented by the party.

In 2025, the Conservatives have an opportunity to take on these issues directly. They have to be careful but also as determined as their historical predecessors to survive.

1. Accept that the brand has been tarnished and needs to be repaired

The Conservatives need a plan that recognises their brand has been tarnished by the Boris Johnson and Liz Truss administrations. Regardless of any justifications for specific policies, the overall record is one of incompetence on issues the Conservatives had traditionally been strong, such as law and order and economic management.

The plan needs to look specifically at regrowth of the party at local level by considering the impact of local identities on voting behaviour and local recruitment. What will convince activists to come back to make the Conservative case, both on doorsteps and on social media?

Restoring their faith in the brand is the first step. They can then work across social media to convince undecided moderates in places such as Bluesky and Threads that they are relevant to their needs.

2. Prove the party is still relevant to voters’ real needs

The Conservatives need to fight back against Reform’s core rhetorical line that neither they nor Labour are relevant to the daily lives of ordinary British people. This will mean highlighting how the Conservatives will be a party for the people, and making the case for how and why voters are, at the end of the day, innately conservatives (with a small c).

Finding those arguments that convince and resonate will be a rhetorical challenge. However, it is the duty of the leadership to find those arguments and show that it is the Conservatives who are relevant while Labour, the Liberal Democrats and Reform are concerned with agendas that are their own.

3. Show we really are all in this together

The gap between the voters and Conservatives was created and solidified by the perception that under recent prime ministers, there was “one rule for them, one rule for the rest of us”. This was typified by the partygate scandal (in which members of Boris Johnson’s government held gatherings that violated the COVID restrictions they had brought in) which helped accelerate the Conservatives’ popular decline.

To redress this, the Conservatives need to show that they share the same concerns and sufferings of the wider population. This is not something which can be manufactured or created by a few lines, rather it is the crafting of a values-based narrative that shows they are affected by the same problems as the voters.

This will start to show that the Conservatives have voters’ interests at heart because they care about the same issues and want to solve the same problems. This is a multi-pronged strategy, with individual MPs showing they cannot get a GP appointment, for example, or are struggling with the everyday issues of the voters they need to secure.

A higher-level strategy should see the leadership telling the stories of struggling Britons. By doing so, they show they are in touch and help prevent Reform from positioning itself as the party of struggling Britain.

Whether the Conservatives have the capacity to deliver on these will depend on their ability to analyse their current situation in a detached and objective manner, while seeking solutions designed to address them. They could – as some parties do in opposition – turn inwards, cut themselves off from voters, and have a self-indulgent civil war.

However, if they do, then they will have little to say to voters at the next election. And they will have gifted Labour and Reform with enough material to convince voters that this old party has become an irrelevance.

In 2025, the Conservatives have a choice between wanting to be relevant and survive, or being irrelevant and accepting even further decline. It’s still possible that 2024 may not be the lowest they can go – which should serve as a warning and a guide.

Andrew S. Roe-Crines does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.