Growing tensions between regional players have led to political moves that could change the status-quo dramatically
In recent months, Egypt has ramped up its foreign policy initiatives in the Horn of Africa and particularly in Somalia. In August, Cairo unexpectedly offered to send its troops to Somalia as part of the new African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). The mission, which is set to begin in January, will assist the Somali military in its fight against jihadist Al-Shabaab groups (the local branch of Al-Qaeda). AUSSOM will replace the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which is scheduled to withdraw by the end of this year with the approval of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU).
However, Egypt’s interests extend beyond its peacekeeping efforts. Numerous indicators suggest that Cairo’s move is motivated by longstanding disputes with Ethiopia over several strategic issues related to water resources.
“The region is entering uncharted waters,” the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated following Egypt’s announcement about joining AUSSOM. “Ethiopia cannot remain idle while other actors take measures to destabilize the region.”
Although it did not mention the specific ‘actors’, it is clear that this message was addressed to Cairo. It was issued shortly after the signing of a defense pact and a military cooperation protocol between Egypt and Somalia, reaffirming their commitment to strengthening bilateral ties and enhancing regional security efforts. The agreement was finalized on August 14, during Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s visit to Cairo, where he met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
The agreement is only partially related to AU peacekeeping efforts. It involves sending 10,000 Egyptian troops to Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia – half of them to support bilateral defense initiatives, and the other half to take part in the new AUSSOM mission. Following the signing of the agreement, at least two cargo planes of the Egyptian Air Force landed in Somalia, loaded with weapons and military supplies for the local armed forces. Between August 27 and 29, around 1,000 Egyptian soldiers arrived in Somalia. Meanwhile, Ethiopia increased its military presence in the Ogaden region, which borders Somalia.
Ethiopia and access to the sea
Like Egypt, Somalia has issues with Ethiopia. Tensions escalated after Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Muse Bihi Abdi, the president of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland (which the international community considers part of Somalia) on January 1, 2024.
This agreement grants Ethiopia access to the Red Sea via the Port of Berbera in exchange for the potential recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty. Somalia considered this move unacceptable, promptly declaring that it would not support Ethiopia’s involvement in the AUSSOM mission unless Ethiopia renounces the agreement with Somaliland. Somalia views the deal as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, as it regards the self-proclaimed republic as part of its territory. In response, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed described access to the Red Sea as an existential issue and a “natural right” but noted that Ethiopia intends to pursue this right in a peaceful way.
Just months before the signing of the MoU with Somaliland, Ethiopia took a similar step in regard to Djibouti. During a meeting of the Ethiopia-Djibouti Defense Experts Joint Committee the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on defense and security cooperation, which could potentially include using the Djibouti port not only for trade but also military purposes. Abiy Ahmed had earlier identified access to the sea as a strategic goal for Ethiopia, whose population is rapidly growing and could reach 150 million people by 2030. He even suggested negotiating with neighboring countries to exchange shares in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in return for access to their ports.
Ethiopia’s statements have raised alarm in neighboring countries like Eritrea, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya – the very nations that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed mentioned. Eritrea characterized the Ethiopian leader’s remarks as “excessive” and said it “perplexed all concerned observers.” Somali State Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Omar said the sovereignty and territorial integrity of his country are “sacred and non-negotiable.”
In an effort to quell concerns, Abiy Ahmed vowed not to invade any neighboring country. However, it’s important to note that Addis Ababa has already established a new branch of its military – the navy. In June 2023, it was reported that the first class of naval officers had graduated after training with both foreign and local instructors, which is a significant development for a landlocked nation.
Ethiopia lost access to the sea in 1993 when Eritrea declared independence following a national referendum. As the world’s most populous landlocked country, Ethiopia has relied exclusively on the port of Djibouti since the Eritrean – Ethiopian War (1998-2000). In recent years, Addis Ababa has been exploring alternative access points, which culminated in the signing of the memorandum of understanding with Somaliland on January 1.
The signing of this agreement has brought Mogadishu and Cairo closer. Somalia views Egypt as a regional ally in its confrontation with Ethiopia, particularly since Egypt is interested in finding a military ally at the border with Ethiopia. Egypt has been involved in a controversial dispute with Ethiopia over the construction of the $4 billion Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Cairo sees as a threat to its water and food security.
In early September, Abiy Ahmed announced the completion of the fourth and final filling of the GERD reservoir on the Blue Nile and said it was an important milestone for the Ethiopian people. It’s important to note that Ethiopia is Africa’s second-most populous country after Nigeria, and the construction of the 6,450 MW capacity dam is vital for its 120 million residents. The main goal is to generate enough electricity to ensure the development of both rural and urban areas of the country.
Egypt, which is located downstream along the Nile, has opposed the GERD project since construction began in 2011. Numerous rounds of negotiations facilitated by international mediators have failed to bring the parties to a mutually beneficial agreement and resulted in a stalemate.
The Entebbe Agreement
The conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt was further aggravated by the implementation of the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), commonly known as the Entebbe Agreement. In June 2024, South Sudan unexpectedly ratified the document, providing the necessary quorum to establish the Nile Basin Commission.
The Entebbe Agreement was originally signed in 2010 by Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, and Burundi. South Sudan joined the agreement in 2012. The agreement nullifies the historical water allocations to Egypt and Sudan (55.5 billion cubic meters annually for Egypt and 18.5 billion cubic meters for Sudan), determined by colonial-era agreements from 1929 and the 1959 agreement “for the full utilization of the Nile waters” between the two countries.
A key provision of the Entebbe Agreement required the document to be ratified by the parliaments of at least six countries in order to establish a special commission that would be permanently headquartered in Uganda.
The commission will have legal authority over all rights and responsibilities related to the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). It will facilitate cooperation among member states to manage water resources in a sustainable and equitable manner, moving away from the previous quota system.
The 1929 agreement granted Egypt the largest share of Nile water and provided it with the power to veto the construction of dams and other water projects in upstream countries (Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi). In 1997, these upstream nations first proposed a collaborative initiative for equitable resource sharing, with Ethiopia being a particularly outspoken advocate of the initiative.
Ethiopia maintains close ties with local Somali groups. Following Somalia’s threat to object to the presence of Ethiopian troops as part of AUSSOM, many leaders and politicians in the autonomous regions of Jubaland and the South-West State of Somalia opposed the government’s plans to expel Ethiopian forces. Self-declared Somaliland and Puntland also actively collaborate with Ethiopia.
Since 2014, Ethiopia has been part of the AU’s peacekeeping forces in Somalia. Currently, over 4,000 Ethiopian soldiers are deployed as part of the ATMIS mission in Somalia. Additionally, thousands of Ethiopian troops are stationed in the central and southern regions of Somalia which border Ethiopia, which is guaranteed by bilateral agreements with the Somali Federal Government (SFG).
Somali forces that operate in these regions alongside Ethiopian soldiers often report to their clan and regional leaders rather than the federal authorities. Historically, their disagreements with the central government have often led to clashes between local and federal forces, and often the regional groups received external support from either Ethiopia or Kenya.
The SFG has begun taking action against local politicians who support Ethiopia. On September 1, President of Somalia Hassan Sheikh Mohamud dismissed the special envoy for health and nutrition affairs after the latter had voiced support for the Ethiopian troops stationed in Somalia and warned against transferring the conflict surrounding the GERD to Somalia. Additionally, the Somali parliament wants to pass a law to strip immunity from 25 MPs from the South-West State region who have also backed Ethiopia’s military presence in Somalia.
Regional partners
Somalia has emerged as Egypt’s primary potential partner in countering Ethiopia. In this regard, it has replaced Sudan, where the civil war that erupted in April 2023 significantly weakened Cairo’s influence. Before the conflict, the Sudanese Armed Forces, which came to power following the 2019 coup, supported Egypt’s stance on the GERD, since Sudan is another downstream Nile country.
In 2020, the two nations conducted joint military exercises, and Egyptian fighter jets were stationed in Sudan to exert pressure on Ethiopia. However, now that the Sudanese Army is fully involved in the internal conflict, Egypt’s military presence in Sudan has been nearly eliminated. The fighting destroyed some of the Egyptian fighter jets stationed in Sudan, and at the onset of the war, some Egyptian pilots were captured, forcing Cairo to withdraw its remaining troops.
Ethiopia’s potential access to the Red Sea poses a threat to Egypt’s maritime trade revenues. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Hamas on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent attacks carried out by the Houthis in the Red Sea, Egypt earned about $9 billion annually from the Suez Canal. Now, amid regional instability, those revenues have plummeted by more than half, and the prospect of Ethiopia gaining access to the Red Sea threatens to increase Egypt’s losses.
A new proxy war?
In late September, an Egyptian military ship delivered a significant shipment of arms to Somalia, including anti-aircraft weapons and artillery. This move has heightened tensions between these two countries and Ethiopia, further complicating the situation in the region. Notably, these military supplies arrived before the start of the AUSSOM mission, which meant that they were not tied to the AU’s peacekeeping efforts. The AU and the UN have yet to finalize the funding of the new mission and other aspects, which means that the deployment of Egyptian forces in Somalia is not part of an organized peacekeeping initiative. Meanwhile, official statements from Ethiopia suggest that its troops are likely to remain in Somalia beyond 2024, regardless of the actions of the SFG.
The escalating tensions also undermine ongoing negotiations between Ethiopia and Somalia, which have been mediated by Türkiye since July 2024. So far, three rounds of talks have taken place, but have yielded no constructive results as both sides continue to blame each other for attempts to destabilize the situation.
Thus, it is possible that the AUSSOM mission – which is set to begin in January 2025 and which has served as a pretext for military cooperation between Somalia and Egypt – could become a trigger that will transform the political tensions into another regional armed conflict.
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