How a Terance Mann corner three may have caused the Warriors’ loss to the Clippers

It certainly affected how they chose to defend key crunchtime possessions.

The story of the night — and a statistic everyone will most certainly point their finger at as the culprit behind the Golden State Warriors’ 102-99 loss to the Los Angeles Clippers — is the Warriors’ collective failure at the free-throw line, where they shot an abysmal 9-of-19 (47.4%) as opposed to the Clippers’ 16-of-18 clip from the charity stripe.

Another notable statistical battle was on three pointers: the Warriors took approximately 48% of their total shots from behind the arc and drilled 16 out of their 44 attempts. The Clippers had a lower 39% three-point attempt rate and also drilled 16 threes, but on fewer attempts (34). While the Warriors chose the volume-is-king approach to taking their threes, the Clippers picked their spots and took shots born out of well-created opportunities, mostly as a result of James Harden’s advantage creation and uncanny ability to read the floor.

As such, the attention must be turned toward a couple of noteworthy statistical nuggets. The Clippers assisted on 83% of their made field goals — their highest assist rate of the season and significantly higher than their season average of 64%. Of their 29 assists against the Warriors, 16 were from Harden alone; seven of those 16 went to Norman Powell, who drilled a couple of big shots down the stretch that eventually wound up hurting the Warriors’ chances. Those two shots are of great importance, but there’s an argument that those looks wouldn’t have been possible without one crucial fourth quarter shot from another Clipper, assisted by — you guessed it — Harden.

At the 7:17 mark of the fourth quarter, Harden — having brought up Steph Curry via triple ball screens to entice a switch, with the Warriors obliging — opted to saunter to his right, no doubt caused by Curry’s “weak” coverage (i.e., shading Harden to his right, which is considered his weak hand). Andrew Wiggins ends up switching onto Terance Mann and “guards” him in the right corner. Entering the night, Mann sported a 9-of-32 clip (28.1%) on threes; on the surface, that gives him a scouting-report designation of “okay to leave open” at the least and “warranting a soft close-out” at most.

However, sifting through Mann’s threes and categorizing them by location, an anomaly that belies his overall prowess as a three-point shooter can be found. On right corner threes, Mann entered the night with a 7-of-15 clip — 63.6%. While the volume is most certainly low, it’s enough to conclude that if Mann were to be parked on a spot on the floor that gives him a modicum of shooting ability, it’s in the right corner.

As such, when Harden starts his drive and sees Wiggins help off of Mann in the strong-side corner (i.e., the side of the court where the ball is located), he makes the simple decision to dish the ball to Mann, who proves the statistical anomaly to be quite a real thing:

While it wasn’t obvious at the time, this Mann three may have had an unfortunate downstream effect on how the Warriors chose to defend two key possessions involving Harden and Powell. I won’t put it past Ty Lue to purposefully use Mann drilling the three above to mess with the Warriors’ decisions on those possessions — and having Mann park himself in the right corner to make them hesitate.

With the Warriors’ troubles containing at the point of attack and having to collapse in the paint against drives by Harden and rolls from Ivica Zubac, they reverted to old overhelping habits, resulting in the Clippers’ efficient three-point clip. As such, the call was made for the Warriors to settle on switching screens against Harden, even at the risk of having Curry expend energy to defend his old rival out on the perimeter. That may have been the correct decision at the time, considering their ineffective three-point defense. But the fear planted by that Mann corner three was a seed that grew too strong to mow down for the Warriors’ weak-side defenders.

In that regard — with Curry once again switched onto Harden — take note of Moses Moody, the designated weak-side defender whose task was to zone up and defend two players:

With Draymond Green stepping up to show help on the drive (called “trapping the box”), Lindy Waters III helping Green by sinking in against Zubac, and Moody seemingly keeping a reasonable distance between Powell on the wing and Mann in the corner, it looks like the Warriors have everything under control. But notice how Powell is a blur in the image above — on the move, not intending to be a standstill operator, and instead of waiting for the ball to come to him, making himself available for a better passing angle.

When Powell completes his relocation, Moody’s attention is still directed toward the on-ball action — while also flashing a slight bias toward Mann in the corner:

Moody forgetting to take note of both man and ball to take note of Mann — perhaps the corner three earlier flashing through his mind as Harden was about to make his decision — results in Powell getting open for a crucial three-point shot:

A few possessions down the line, the same exact setup — with the exception being that it’s Buddy Hield defending Harden in isolation, Wiggins on the backline helping the helper, and Waters being designated as the weak-side zone man — occurs. As Harden starts his drive, Green steps up to trap the box, with Wiggins sinking in on Zubac to help Green. Just like Moody above, Waters shows an inclination toward Mann in the corner as Harden is about to make his decision:

Waters’ bias toward Mann is punished by Powell’s relocation — and once again, an inclination to take away a potential Mann corner look results in another huge three-point bucket for the Clippers:

While the game wasn’t certainly lost on the possessions above — the Warriors’ turnover woes and trouble in generating efficient half-court looks resulted in scoring a measly 97.1 points per 100 possessions, not to mention the free throw woes — it shone a light on habits they may want to nip in the bud as the season progresses. That said, limiting the Clippers to an even 100 points per 100 possessions is still indicative of a good defensive game, but in a game as close as this, even a few instances of blown defensive coverages and wrong decisions — born out of “fear” of a previous, seemingly unrelated corner three — proves the power of one singular possession.