Can the U.S. Navy Really Build 3 Submarines Per Year?

What You Need to Know: The U.S. Navy aims to boost submarine production to three per year—one Columbia-class and two Virginia-class—by 2028 through the "1+2+Sustainment" plan, addressing domestic and AUKUS pact obligations.

-Current output averages just 1.3 submarines annually, hindered by COVID-era supply chain issues, workforce shortages, and production inefficiencies.

-Rear Admiral Jonathan Rucker emphasized the need to "uplift the whole system," recognizing risks like skilled labor deficits and maintenance delays.

-Despite challenges, including the costly delays of the USS District of Columbia, Rucker remains cautiously optimistic about achieving higher production rates and revitalizing America's submarine industrial base.

U.S. Navy Targets Three Submarines Annually by 2028 Amid Industry Challenges

The U.S. Navy’s submarine force, the “Silent Service,” has a long and proud history in the annals of U.S. Navy (USN) service. However, whilst that force is still a very powerful and formidable one—as exemplified by the Los Angeles-class nuclear-powered fast attacks submarines (SSN), Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and cruise missile subs (SSGNs)—the service has also hit some metaphorical “rough seas” as of late.

As I recently reported: the Navy’s SSN(X) program has been pushed back past the year 2035 and is shaping up to be a $6.2-billion boondoggle and therefore might not survive the budgetary chopping block. Moreover, the powerful Seawolf-class boats are also “endangered species” (so to speak), by virtue of the fact that only three were built out of the original twenty-nine ships that were planned. Meanwhile, only twenty-four out of the sixty-six planned Virginia-class SSNs have been completed so far (with twenty-three in active service), at a unit cost of $2.8 billion. And as (not so sweet) icing on the cake, the USS District of Columbia (SSBN-826) is proving to be a $130 billion nightmare, sixteen months behind schedule, with a delivery date of fiscal year 2028 looking overly optimistic at this point.

So then, what does all this mean for America’s submarine-building capabilities and capacity? Can it actually be bolstered?

The Baseline Story

The latest and (not necessarily) greatest comes to us from journalist Laura Heckmann in a November 13, 2024, article for National Defense Magazine titled “JUST IN: Navy Hopes to Bump Sub Production to 3 Per Year by 2028.”

Currently, American submarine production is only averaging to 1.3 completed boats per year. However, the Navy has set a lofty goal of boosting that to three completed subs per year—specifically one Columbia-class and two Virginia-class submarines—by 2028, via a program known as the “1+2+Sustainment by 2028.” The “Sustainment” part of that label refers to foreign military sales (FMS) obligations such as the AUKUS pact, i.e., the trilateral security agreement between the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines.

Further Detail

Heckmann draws heavily upon quotes from Rear Admiral Jonathan Rucker, program executive officer, attack submarines (PEO SSN), who delivered germane remarks at the Naval Submarine League’s Annual Symposium and Industry Update (which was hosted at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Arlington, Virginia):

“‘We developed [the plan] starting in February of 2023,’ the foundation of which is Columbia, the ‘number one priority,’ he said. With that in mind, ‘we start serial production [of Columbia] in 2026 … if you count the time it takes to start and then get the whole production system up to that. Because when you start, you got to get the whole thing. So that Columbia kind of puts us there in that timeframe.’”

As for the Virginia-class, the good admiral noted that prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the production rate had already almost reached two ships per year—1.85 to be technically precise—before the supply chain nightmares endemic to that pandemic dragged the production rate down to the 1.1-1.2 rate. However, production problems actually surfaced as soon as 2018, i.e., even before the COVID-19 crisis.

Where To From Here?

Rucker, for all of his lofty ambitions, is also “frank” enough to acknowledge that there are “some risks” which present the “challenge of our time.”

The biggest problem is a maintenance shortfall and material delays that stem from a shortage of skilled personnel available to actually engage in shipbuilding, which explains the huge “Build Submarines” recruiting push which is sponsored by the Department of the Navy in tandem with the BlueForge Alliance. That recruitment effort has a long way to go.

In spite of this, Rucker remains cautiously optimistic, asserting that “[T]he whole system has to be uplifted. We’re on that journey. We’re about halfway there, and we’re going to continue to get there.”

Time will tell.

About the Author: Christian D. Orr

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for the National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS).

Image Credit: Creative Commons.