Donald Trump: Back to the Future on Iran Policy

Tehran’s theocrats must be terrified. That’s a good thing.

Despite the limited and lackluster commentary on Donald Trump’s electoral victory in the Iranian press and by officials, regime elites must now face the fact that the candidate they sought to kill is set to re-assume the presidency on January 20, 2025.

During his fist term, Trump functioned like a bull in a china shop on Iran policy, and it worked. The administration pulled out of the fatally flawed 2015 Iran nuclear deal, designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a foreign terrorist organization, showed the strength of US unilateral sanctions against the Iranian economy, and even killed Quds-Force Commander Qassem Soleimani, Tehran’s chief terrorist-strategist. And for good measure, Trump drew a sharp contrast with his predecessor by strongly supporting Iranian protestors. In so doing, he broke long-held taboos among the Washington establishment about foreign backing being a kiss of death. And he did it all without triggering World War Three.

A second Trump administration is reportedly set to resume its “maximum pressure” policy against the Islamic Republic, the broad contours of which are encompassed by the above moves. Returning to this policy would course-correct the outgoing Biden administration’s approach, which has been defined by light sanctions enforcement, a preference for de-escalation over deterrence, and turning a blind eye to Iran’s growing atomic infrastructure and nuclear saber-rattling.

But the resurrection of this policy cannot be divorced from the challenges of the present. 2025 will be harder than 2016-2020 were. Iran today is on the nuclear threshold, with an enriched uranium stockpile and centrifuge capacity assessed by experts to be able to produce sufficient weapons grade uranium for one bomb in a week, and up to 15 in five months.

Iran is also increasing its missile capabilities, hinting that it might develop longer-range projectiles that could threaten the European continent and the American homeland. It is also relying on trans-national criminal syndicates rather than traditional proxies, trying everything from Mexican drug cartels to Azeri gangs to Canadian bikers, to reach onto American soil. Had the Islamic Republic been deterred or felt it had more to lose than to gain from these threats and plots, it would not have embarked on them.

For deterrence to work, a credible military threat is needed. Given that deterrence is first and foremost psychological, threats alone may be insufficient for an adversary as resolute as the Islamic Republic and one with the impression of America as a risk-averse power. In order to avoid a larger conflict with the Islamic Republic, the US will counterintuitively be required to push back earlier and harder against the full-spectrum of Iran-backed threats to change the impression of American risk-tolerance for Iranian national security decision-makers.

A pure “management” approach towards Tehran that aims to contain rather than roll-back the full-spectrum of these threats will only lead to Washington being managed by Tehran. Now is the time to push past mere management as a strategy and work to roll back threats.

The maximum pressure strategy during Trump’s first term began to lay the groundwork to do precisely that. By targeting Iran’s oil, natural gas, petrochemical, and industrial metal exports, the administration aimed to put the macroeconomic squeeze on Tehran, shrinking the overall ability to resource threats. This campaign reduced Iran’s 2.9 million barrels a day oil exports from 2018 to 775,000 by 2021. Trump’s policies also led to a decline in non-oil exports, with Iran’s total exports dropping by 12.8% in 2020.

Iran’s oil exports surged under the Biden administration, largely due to a relaxed sanctions enforcement posture and the prospects for nuclear diplomacy. As a result, Iran’s annual oil revenue reportedly soared, rising from $16 billion in 2020 to $53 billion in 2023. In August 2023 alone, Iran’s exports to China peaked at an estimated 1.5 million barrels per day — a sharp increase from the lower levels seen during the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign. As a reminder, China has been the most importer purchaser of Iranian oil — increasingly marked as “Malaysian” — for over a decade.

Iran’s petroleum export value and volume under the Biden administration also drastically increased, countering the sharp decline seen amid Trump-era sanctions. Between 2021 and 2023, Tehran generated an estimated $144 billion from petroleum sales, a stark contrast to the mere $16 billion in 2020. The increase has been substantial across multiple categories, with crude oil and condensate exports rising over threefold, reaching 1.59 million barrels per day, while Iranian petroleum product exports expanded over 50% in the same timeframe.

The new administration should work overtime to plug the economic lifelines Tehran has benefited from in the illicit petrochemical and oil trade. The Trump administration previously warned of sanctions against Chinese entities involved in importing Iranian oil, and this stance should be maintained if Beijing continues enabling Tehran’s sanctions evasion, which in turn underwrites Tehran’s global terrorist apparatus and regional “ring of fire” against Israel. Likewise, the next administration must take a firm stand, emphasizing the severe consequences for any person, bank, or business aiding the Islamic Republic’s illicit trade.

The United States should marry this economic pressure with a political strategy that aims to multiliterate maximum pressure with its trans-Atlantic and five-eyes partners. First and foremost, this must begin by commencing a diplomatic track on day-one with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom to reinstate UN sanctions on Iran by triggering the snapback mechanism set to expire this October in UN Security Council Resolution 2231.

The administration should also impress upon its allies to leverage their individual counterterrorism authorities and designate the IRGC in its entirety as a terrorist organization. After more than a decade of deliberation, Canada has done precisely this. Other US partners should be encouraged to follow suit.

Additionally, Washington should impose strict limitations on the entry of Iranian officials into the US for United Nations-related matters and closely monitor their movements. To further isolate the Islamic Republic diplomatically, the US should press its European counterparts to either reduce the size of Iran’s diplomatic missions or expel Iranian diplomats and shutter these embassies altogether.

While former US Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook, who is reportedly leading Trump’s transition team at the State Department, claims the incoming administration isn’t aiming for regime change, the brittleness of the deeply unpopular regime in Tehran and the impact maximum pressure can have will mean nationwide anti-regime demonstrations like those seen in 2019 and 2022 are more a matter of when and not if.

To recalibrate US strategy toward Iran, Washington must find ways to empower the Iranian street against the state, and in a manner in conjunction with American values and broader regional interests. Marrying “Maximum Support” for the Iranian people with maximum pressure against the regime may provide the necessary pincer that can force the Islamic Republic into settling for suboptimal outcomes or better yet, making mistakes that can be capitalized upon.

By leveraging enduring internal opposition to the regime, Washington can bolster the efforts of the Iranian people in their fight for a government that reflects their views, values, and interests. The next administration must have the audacity to imagine what a Middle East without the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism looks like, one which distracted time, attention, and resources away from rising security challenges in the Asia-Pacific.

To assist Iranians in defining their own destiny, the US should provide them access to free, reliable Internet through the provision of VPNs and collaboration with private companies like Starlink. Intelligence support can also help protestors outwit the regime’s forces, enabling them to leverage their non-violent resistance effectively. Additionally, the US should coordinate with allies to provide cyber support, targeting regime communications infrastructure, disabling surveillance systems, and disrupting the security forces’ command and control. Giving Iranians a tactical advantage ensures they are better equipped to confront a well-armed authoritarian regime, especially the next time Iranians take to the streets en masse.

The Islamic Republic is a determined adversary that means what it says when it chants “death to America” and “death to Israel.” The same applies to its attempts to take President Trump’s life. Only by building on the successes from his first term does the incoming president stand a chance at meaningfully confronting Iran, and maximizing the fears in Tehran about what will come next.