Before September 2024, the upcoming first regular election next year in the five-year-old Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) was already shaping up to be a highly anticipated event. 

Sulu Governor Abdusakur Tan, who announced his bid to become BARMM’s chief minister last May, was set to face whoever would emerge as the contender from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).  

There were speculations then that the MILF might not push Chief Minister Ahod “Murad” Ebrahim to serve another term, and that Malacañang was pushing to have another MILF leader to take on the role as chief minister. 

The rebels-turned-politicians who have shaped and controlled BARMM enjoyed the support of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who celebrated the regional government’s accomplishments in his 2024 State of the Nation Address. MILF formed the political party United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP).

The big political clans rallied behind Tan and together formed the BARMM Grand Coalition (BGC). They hoped that Tan’s longstanding loyalty to the Marcoses would persuade the President to refrain from intervening.

On September 9, just a month before the politicians were to file their certificates of candidacy (COCs), the Supreme Court pulled the rug from under Tan’s feet. Voting unanimously, the SC justices dismissed petitions to declare the creation of BARMM as unconstitutiona,l but ruled to remove Sulu from the BARMM on the basis that it voted no during the 2019 plebiscite.  

One of the petitions was filed in 2018 by Tan’s own son and namesake, Abdusakur Tan II, long before the elder Tan had aspired to become BARMM chief minister.

Tan, the only guy who was seen to have a fighting chance against the MILF, was no longer eligible to run for a regional post. BGC has not announced plans to field another candidate for chief minister.

Sulu and the autonomous region have yet to see the extent of the impact of the SC’s decision. Over 5,000 BARMM employees in Sulu are poised to lose their jobs, and infrastructure projects could be discontinued if they lose funding from the regional government. 

“Please do not abandon us, as we need your support. After all, the Bangsamoro Organic Law, as reflected in its numerous provisions, envisioned that Sulu, as a core territory, would share in the allocated budget,” BARMM Deputy Speaker Nabil Tan said in a privilege speech before his fellow BARMM parliament members. He also asked the SC to reconsider its decision. 

Beyond these pressing practical concerns, many Bangsamoro residents have bewailed the SC decision. 

Sulu is the cradle of the Bangsamoro’s struggle for freedom, the Tausug homeland and the birthplace of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the first Muslim separatist rebel group in the Philippines. The province is integral to the region’s rich history.

“The Bangsamoro won’t be complete without Sulu. This is a major blow to our efforts to push for the unity of provinces in the region,” said Basilan Representative Mujiv Hataman, former governor of the defunct Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and now one of BGC’s stalwarts.

On October 1, human rights lawyer Algamar Latiph asked the Supreme Court to reconsider its decision. He is one of the respondents-in-intervention for the case. The BARMM government has also filed an intervention with the High Court.

It took the court five years to decide Tan’s petition. Who knows how long the SC will take to rule on the new ones, and if the high tribunal would overturn a unanimous decision at all. 

Meanwhile, what happens to the first regular elections in the Bangsamoro in 2025? 

On the eve of the first day of candidacy filing on November 4, Senate President Francis Escudero told a radio program he was going to file a bill to postpone the BARMM parliamentary elections again, stating that Malacañang wanted it. A committee hearing was immediately scheduled for November 7.

(Editor’s Note: On Tuesday, November 12, the Supreme Court said the BARMM polls cannot be postponed.)

Here are five scenarios for the 2025 Bangsamoro polls, based on recent developments and interviews with Bangsamoro stakeholders and experts interviewed by the PCIJ.

Scenario 1: The first regular elections in the BARMM will be postponed again

Until the eleventh hour, it seemed unlikely, given pronouncements from President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. that he wanted the polls to push through. But Bangsamoro experts and stakeholders never dismissed it.

The Commission on Elections had moved the filing of COCs from October 1-8 to November 4-9 or a month later than the rest of the country to allow political parties time to adjust following Sulu’s exclusion from the BARMM. Comelec Chairman George Garcia said the poll body was “hell-bent” on conducting the polls next year. 

The BARMM parliament is supposed to have 80 members based on its charter. Forty should come from party nominees, 32 from parliamentary districts, including seven in Sulu, and eight from sectoral groups. 

In the wake of the SC ruling, BARMM Cabinet Secretary and spokesperson Mohd Asnin Pendatun said it was possible to reassign the seven Sulu district seats, but the process would be long and tedious. 

Comelec said they would proceed with preparations to hold elections for 73 seats in the BARMM parliament.

The candidacy filing opened on November 4 but Escudero’s call to postpone the elections loomed heavily over the event.

Escudero is seeking to delay the first regular elections by another year — from May 12, 2025 to May 11, 2026 — to allow the autonomous region to “reconfigure its jurisdictions as well as reallocate the seats of its 80-member parliament.”

Escudero’s proposal followed a last-minute Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) Resolution No. 6411, which urged to extend the transition period to May 2028.

“If Malacañang is the one calling for Congress to amend the organic law in order to postpone the elections, it will most probably happen,” said Benedicto Bacani, executive director of the Institute for Autonomy and Governance.

Senator Juan Miguel Zubiri warned of a potential “backlash” if the BARMM polls are postponed, however. He said it would not sit well among among locally elected leaders.

Earlier proposals to postpone the elections and extend the elections were generally dismissed.

The League of Bangsamoro Organizations called to extend the BTA’s term for three more years and postpone the parliamentary elections until 2028. It was first postponed in 2022 because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The group argued that the BTA, led by the MILF, needed more time to complete the normalization process. 

The MILF and the national government have yet to fully decommission armed rebels, disband private armed groups and ramp up transitional justice efforts. Only when normalization is fulfilled can the two parties sign an exit agreement.

“If we’re gonna accept that argument, there won’t be an election in 100 years in the BARMM because, number one, there’s not gonna be any exit agreement without charter change,” said Bacani. 

There are several other issues awaiting the Supreme Court’s resolution.

In June 2023, a group of BARMM officials and residents also urged the high court to nullify the Bangsamoro Electoral Code for “violating” the 1987 Constitution, the Bangsamoro Organic Law and the Omnibus Election Code.

According to the petitioners, the code infringes upon Comelec and SC’s mandates and employs “restrictive” qualifications that hamper political parties’ ability to seek parliament seats. The code mandates the political parties to have 10,000 members.

Scenario 2: Elections proceed in May 2025, and MILF wins majority to continue leading BARMM

Only BARMM has a parliamentary system in the Philippines. In this system, political parties must secure a majority of the seats to control the government. 

In the autonomous region, this means that a political party needs at least 41 of its political party nominees, district candidates, and sectoral nominees to win to secure the position of chief minister without outside support.

The SC decision removing Sulu from BARMM changed the dynamics of next year’s elections. With Tan out of the way, many believe that MILF’s UBJP has an improved chance of winning a majority of the parliament seats and continue to lead the autonomous region, although it is now smaller in land area and population. 

The SC has given the MILF a “tactical advantage” and it doesn’t make sense for the group to support calls for postponement, said an NGO worker.  

Malacañang has indicated support for a scenario in which MILF would continue to rule.

An Institute for Policy Analysis and Conflict report showed that “some of President Marcos’ advisers are suggesting that keeping the MILF in power…will help ensure security and stability.” The report was based on interviews with politicians in BARMM.

On June 24, a leaked voice recording of a known Marcos political supporter, South Cotabato Governor Reynaldo Tamayo Jr., surfaced. He allegedly threatened local executives in BARMM to support the UBJP, lest they would be investigated by the Commission on Audit. Tamayo is the president of the President’s party, Partido Federal ng Pilipinas.

Scenario 3: Another party secures majority, and UBJP becomes minority

All political parties must submit a list of 40 nominees ranked first to last. To get one parliament seat, the political parties need to obtain four percent of total votes.

Other than UBJP, BGC is the only other party capable of winning more than 41 combined seats from its political party, district, and sectoral candidates, according to Rona “Ona” Caritos of the Legal Network for Truthful Elections. 

BGC remains a powerful contender even without Tan, owing to the influence of the other parties and political clans behind it:

• Al-Ittihad-UKB, led by Maguindanao del Sur Governor Mariam Sangki-Mangudadatu and husband Teng Mangudadatu
• Serbisyong Inklusibo Alyansang Progresibo Party (SIAP), led by Lanao del Sur Governor Mamintal Adiong Jr.
• Bangsamoro People Party (BPP), led by Basilan Representative Mujiv Hataman

Bacani believes that many of the elected members from parliamentary districts will still come from BGC because of the clans’ constituencies.

BARMM voters will come from Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao del Norte, Maguindanao del Sur, Basilan (except Isabela City), Tawi-Tawi, and the Special Geographic Area, a loose collection of 63 barangays in North Cotabato. 

“If the MILF’s nominees are their current BTA members…majority are Maguindanaon. That’s just one province,” Bacani said.

“Given the control of governors in the local elections and their alliance, that means they will just have to deliver the province to BGC and they get the majority,” Bacani added.

What will become of the peace process if traditional politicians wrest regional power from the MILF?

They promised to implement all signed peace agreements. BGC also said that the coalition will “push for the annual P5 billion SDF (special development fund) to support the transition of combatants and communities.”

Scenario 4: No party secures majority. A coalition government is formed

If neither UBJP nor BGC will win a majority of the seats in the parliament, the political parties will have to forge coalitions to form the regional government. 

It could happen, depending on developments before the elections. Several parties have a viable chance of winning a few seats. (LIST: BARMM regional parties accredited for the May 2025 parliamentary elections)

All political parties can form different permutations of coalitions to secure the majority.

The following scenarios could further play out:

• MILF forms a coalition government with smaller parties and keeps the leadership of BARMM.
• BGC forms a coalition government with smaller parties.
• MILF and BGC form a coalition government.
• If they have enough votes to form a majority, smaller parties form a coalition government, and both MILF and BGC become minority.

In this scenario, peace advocate Augusto “Gus” Miclat Jr. said parties in the minority can play a bigger role in the parliament.

“[If you don’t secure a majority], you struggle to consolidate the forces you have within Parliament and your constituencies outside to ensure that there are checks and balances,” said Miclat, the director of the Initiatives for International Dialogue.

The political parties that may have lost members after Sulu was removed from the region were instructed to recruit new members and comply with the requirement of having 10,000 members. 

Two factions of the MNLF have registered as regional political parties. The BAPA party of the Muslimin Sema faction was granted accreditation. The Mahardika party of the Nur Misuari faction was denied accreditation, but it filed a motion for reconsideration. It is pending as of this writing.

Scenario 5: Failure of elections is declared in a number of localities, delaying the determination of majority vote

Election-related violence in BARMM has continuously risen since 2018, the Council for Climate and Conflict Action Asia’s (CCAA) report shows.

CCAA executive director Francisco Lara Jr. believes that a failure of election in some localities is not far off. “It is a reality,” he said in a press briefing in August.

Most incidents occurred in Lanao del Sur, while most deaths transpired in Maguindanao, the region’s seat of political power.

“The violence in the mainland during the past two election years may be a prelude to the 2025 elections,” the report said. CCAA also predicted that violence will be “fueled by the challenge of former rebel groups against traditional politicians who [aim] to strengthen their political legitimacy in the region.”

In general, violence has been on the rebound since 2021, the report further said.

The leading cause is still the shadow economy, which includes illegal drugs and guns. This was followed by identity issues stemming from land disputes, clan feuds, and extremist violence.

Lara raised important questions if BARMM elections are derailed: “Who operates in the interim if a failure of election is called? Doesn’t it extend the power and the authority of the incumbent?”

“We are not here to make the BARMM look bad, or OPAPRU (Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity) look bad, or the Comelec look bad. But they have to be abreast of what is happening. And they have to honestly look at the figures of violence,” he added.

For Miclat, the Bangsamoro and national governments will have to join hands to ensure that the polls materialize in the region. But he reminds everyone that the elections only form part of the peace process. 

“The heart and soul of the peace agreement is not the elections but the full implementation of the peace agreement by ensuring…the creation of the transitional justice board…holistic approach to peace and security addressing displacement and providing the social economic packages, compensation to displaced communities in Marawi, and the like,” he said.

After all the ballots have been counted and the candidates proclaimed, the work continues, he said.

“The peace process will have to be hand-in-hand with the governance of the government of the day, whoever that is,” Miclat said. – with reports from Carmela Fonbuena/Rappler.com

This article was republished with permission from the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism.