Lebanon peace deal: Israel-Hezbollah agreement needs to be guaranteed by the Lebanese armed forces

After a month of heavy bombardment, and despite continuing its military campaign and clearing border villages in south Lebanon, Israel is reportedly indirectly negotiating a peace deal with Hezbollah leaders. The terms of a ceasefire require the full implementation of UN resolution 1701, with a presence of around 10,000 Lebanese armed forces (LAF) soldiers stationed along the “blue line” which divides Israel from Lebanon and the Golan Heights. But making 1701 work has always proved a challenge.

There can be no doubt that since its inception in 2006, resolution 1701 has never been fully implemented in south Lebanon. Adopted unanimously in 2006, the purpose of the resolution was to end hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel, with the UN security council calling for a permanent ceasefire.

A key objective of 1701 is to ensure the area south of the Litani River in south Lebanon is free from any weapons other than those of the Lebanese state and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil)

It is on this issue that Unifil has received the most opprobrium. International observers and politicians have criticised Unifil’s inability to locate and remove Hezbollah’s weapons. The IDF blames Unifil for failing to prevent the rearmament of Hezbollah and for allegedly not doing enough to prevent Hezbollah attacks on Israel.

Conversely, in Lebanon, Hezbollah supporters rebuke Unifil for failing to prevent six IDF invasions over half a century. This, they argue, makes Hezbollah’s presence on the blue line essential.

But the question of why resolution 1701 was not fully implemented is not a simple one. Multiple actors are involved, of which one key player is the LAF. A large part of fulfilling resolution 1701 means ensuring that LAF are deployed in southern Lebanon as the only legitimate provider of force representing the Lebanese government. Understanding their role and the constraints they face is an important part of the puzzle.

Prior to the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, south Lebanon was sparsely populated and regarded as strategically unimportant. When civil war broke out, political and operational factors meant the LAF could not deploy to the south.

These factors included the defection of LAF officers to sectarian militia and a lack of sufficient resources. The influence of neighbouring Syria and the heavy presence of militia groups, plus the occupation of the “zone of security” in south Lebanon by the IDF and its proxy militia the South Lebanon Army complicated matters.

After the 2006 war, LAF became an important official party to resolution 1701 and Unifil worked closely with them to fulfil three main objectives: first, to assist with their re-introduction into the area of operations; second, to improve their operational capabilities; and third, to seek international funding for the LAF to improve their technical capabilities.

Hunting for Hezbollah

Unifil is mandated to assist LAF in taking steps towards the establishment of an area free from armed personnel between the blue line and the Litani River.

Until recently LAF and Unifil often conducted joint patrols to search for unexploded ordinance and unauthorised weapons. If Unifil independently discovered an illegal weapons cache, it would notify the LAF, which handled the weapons’ recovery.

This approach helped Unifil sidestep confrontations with the local population, on whose support they depend to patrol safely and execute the mandate. But while this policy was supportive of the goals of 1701, ultimately it proved ineffective.

There were a number of reasons for this. First, the LAF faces legal restrictions on entering private property. If it suspects illegal weapons are stored on private land, the LAF needs a court order to enter the property. This takes time, which gives the owner of the property the opportunity to remove the weapons. To fully implement 1701, this legal barrier would need to be removed.

The LAF also has to walk a political tightrope between different political factions in Beirut, and is also sensitive to the need for local support in the south. While LAF is undoubtedly popular in Lebanon, many in the south are Shia Muslims with strong loyalties to Hezbollah and the Amal movement (a Shia militia which now operates as a political party in Lebanon). These groups offer both a degree of security and material help in the form of social services.

While conducting field research in southern Lebanon from 2012 to 2018, I discovered that civilians in the region understand that it is difficult for LAF to hunt aggressively for weapons. This is because they need to retain a working relationship with Hezbollah which – with its allies – constitutes the political majority in Beirut. Ridding south Lebanon of Hezbollah weapons will require political cover from Beirut.

Another problem the LAF has faced is getting hold of modern weaponry due to Israeli opposition, despite the LAF enjoying strong international support. Israel’s “qualitative military edge” strategy, supported by the US, means that it campaigns internationally against any of its border states obtaining weapons deemed to pose a threat to its security. This has on occasion prevented LAF from accepting essential defensive equipment, such as armoured vehicles and air defence systems, from its European friends.

Preventing LAF from getting defensive equipment contradicts the EU and US stated goal of strengthening LAF. It also supports Hezbollah’s claim that it can only hand over national security to LAF when it is properly equipped to defend Lebanon. A civilian I interviewed in south Lebanon in 2013 summed up the paradox: “We would prefer that the international community made a decision to allow the military to be armed properly, and then we don’t need the resistance.”

Ultimately the political and legal tightrope the LAF walks in Lebanon is deeply implicated in why resolution 1701 has never been fully implemented. Neither a national army nor a peacekeeping force are capable of enforcing a Hezbollah withdrawal in the absence of political and legal agreement in Beirut, or local support in south Lebanon.

Any calls for the full implementation of 1701 will require the unqualified support of all parties to 1701. This is not just those involved in the conflict – Israel, Hezbollah and the Lebanese government – but also various international stakeholders including the US, EU and all countries with UN peacekeepers in Lebanon. It will be a delicate balance.

Vanessa Newby does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.