U.S. Failures in Iraq Expose the Dangers of Trump’s War on the ‘Deep State’

Donald Trump remains obsessed with the “Deep State.” 

He may have failed as president to execute his most ambitious plans, which involved slashing protections for civil servants — the thousands of federal government employees who serve continually under both Democratic and Republican administrations. But Trump has promised not to miss the chance again if he is re-elected. His campaign pledges to increase the President’s power to “clean out” departments of “faceless bureaucrats” who might slow down his agenda. Project 2025, produced by the conservative Heritage Foundation, similarly proposes that many civil service positions be replaced with political appointees selected directly by the president.

These proposals claim that clearing out civil servants will produce a more effective government, one that is more responsive to election results. Such a system, however, threatens the stability and efficiency of government operations, and scholars have pointed out how Congress created the civil service in response to government corruption in the late 19th century. But there is another far more recent American experiment that illustrates the problems with what both Trump and the Heritage Foundation envision.

In 2003, a U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq and quickly toppled Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. The George W. Bush Administration created the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to serve as Iraq’s temporary occupation government, and it rapidly filled positions in the CPA with political loyalists. The results were disastrous, suggesting what might happen if Trump manages to replace thousands of civil servants with political appointees.

Read More: How Far Trump Would Go

In the run up to the Iraq War, George W. Bush made his priority clear: regime change. Throughout 2002, the Bush Administration dismissed warnings from within the U.S. government about potential problems that might arise after toppling Hussein — ranging from skyrocketing costs to the potential for chaos. Reflecting the administration’s belligerently optimistic view that installing democracy in Iraq would be easy, high-ranking leaders in the Defense Department sidelined deeply-researched reports produced by other agencies that warned of catastrophe.

This resulted in a critical lack of post-invasion planning. Arriving on the heels of coalition troops, CPA officials landed in Iraq and realized that the invasion and fall of Hussein’s government had caused untold devastation and a breakdown in law and order. This prompted them to urgently request more personnel.

The administration responded by dispatching passionate but inexperienced political allies rather than professionals with relevant governing experience. The White House took advantage of workforce procedures that enabled it to staff the CPA with direct hires, circumventing the civil service. It used this discretion to prioritize ideology and loyalty, not experience. Journalist Rajiv Chandrakesan reported that the White House consistently asked one question before picking someone: did you vote for George W. Bush? 

The results were stark. Initially, the US Agency for International Development sent a disaster-response health expert with a long career in government service to reconstruct Iraq’s healthcare system. The Bush Administration, however, swiftly replaced him with a social worker from Michigan, who had strong ties to the Republican Party and ran a Christian adoption agency. At the appointee’s directive, the CPA would, for months, focus on privatizing Iraq’s pharmaceutical delivery system instead of rehabilitating emergency rooms in a country decimated and plagued by instability.

The rush to fill positions with loyal Republicans meant that other novices ended up with far too much responsibility. For example, the CPA asked for 10 staffers, essentially “gofers,” to come to Baghdad on short notice to perform administrative tasks. When the staffers arrived in Baghdad, however, the CPA assigned six of them to manage Iraq’s $13 billion budget. None had any experience in finance or budget management. But they did have one thing in common: they had sent their resumes to the Heritage Foundation.

Read More: How Disbanding the Iraqi Army Fueled ISIS

The young staffers were overwhelmed by the work, and their inexperience contributed to repeated budget difficulties in 2003 and 2004. They were enthusiastic, but simply not qualified for the role into which they had been thrust. Military personnel assigned to the CPA complained that these “staffers were so inexperienced and rotated out so quickly it was difficult for them to act on anything.” 

With the group in charge of releasing funds for salaries, Iraqi police officers complained that they were not paid consistently, if at all. While the CPA struggled through budget and finance issues with Iraqi security forces, a growing insurgency had begun to promise thousands of dollars to new recruits willing to attack Americans.

Other similarly comical personnel decisions also contributed to 2003 becoming a “lost year” in the occupation. A 24-year-old with no finance background landed the job of reopening Iraq’s stock exchange, thanks to White House contacts. One of his first moves was to get rid of an U.S. Army reservist with finance expertise who had been assigned to help. The stock exchange did eventually reopen, but five months behind schedule. 

As senior adviser to Iraq’s Ministry of the Interior, Bush tapped former New York City Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik. Kerik was well known from his role during 9/11 and had good Republican connections. However, the former commissioner, though he did plenty of media appearances, delegated away the details of international police training. That led to a chaotic three months.

Many CPA officials, including political appointees, labored diligently and faithfully in impossible circumstances. But the rush to fill the Iraqi occupation government with political loyalists meant that there were far too few with the necessary background to make the right choices to run a functional government under difficult circumstances.

The results were catastrophic. A year after Bush declared “mission accomplished,” Iraq was ruptured by a violent insurgency and economic chaos. The CPA’s early failures played a role in the start of a bubbling conflict that by 2011, left100,000 Iraqis and 4,000 Americans dead.

While some political appointees are necessary for a president to execute his or her agenda, the 2024 Trump campaign’s promise to replace federal civil servants with political loyalists threatens to repeat the historical catastrophes of Iraq, where entire agencies were heavily staffed based on who had political connections. Without civil servants who can balance political initiatives with experience, there is little to stop chaos from spiraling out of control.

Syrus Solo Jin is a PhD candidate at the University of Chicago and a national fellow for the Jefferson Scholars Foundation. He researches U.S. military-building and the racial and cultural underpinnings of American global power.

Made by History takes readers beyond the headlines with articles written and edited by professional historians. Learn more about Made by History at TIME here. Opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of TIME editors.