In the Shadow of War: The Promise and Peril of Covert Action
The world just witnessed one of the most remarkable intelligence operations in history. A flood of reports have claimed that Israel sabotaged pagers used by the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah and detonated them simultaneously, killing several and wounding hundreds or even thousands of its operatives. Hezbollah has vowed retaliation, but the sophisticated nature of the attack and its effects on Hezbollah’s communications, command and control, and morale have severely shaken the organization. Quickly lost in the accusations, threats, and uncertainty following the operation is the fact that Israel has not officially claimed responsibility for it. That is because it falls under a special, secret category of statecraft known as covert action.
Covert action is an operation in which the role of the sponsor is supposed to remain hidden or unacknowledged. Put another way, it creates “plausible deniability,” which allows governments to deny their knowledge of—or participation in—covert operations. States typically employ covert action in situations where they cannot accomplish their goals through overt measures or where the risk of taking credit for an operation is too great. Covert action is especially valuable when states conduct operations that could otherwise be seen as acts of war, such as deadly attacks within the sovereign borders of another state.
This latest covert operation follows another recent one targeting Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July. According to reports, Haniyeh and his bodyguard were killed by an explosive device hidden in his room in a heavily guarded guesthouse run by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Suspicion immediately fell on Israel, which has a long history of targeted killings. Humiliated by such an enormous intelligence failure, Iran promised to retaliate. Defying expert predictions that it would strike Israel directly within days, Iran has seemingly backed off. It has hinted that its revenge will be “different” and not necessarily the large military operation that everyone feared would result in a regional war.
All this after Israel allegedly killed several IRGC officers, who were themselves involved in covert operations, in a strike against an Iranian consulate in Damascus in April. Iran responded by launching a massive salvo of drones, missiles, and rockets at Israel that did minimal damage thanks to the efforts of the United States, Israel, and several Arab states. It was the first direct military attack in what had previously been a shadow war that Iran and Israel have been waging for decades.
It was particularly ironic and even irrational that Iran would respond directly to an unacknowledged Israeli attack with overt military force. After all, Iran has largely attained its current position of power in the Middle East by working covertly through proxies. And while Iran has suffered losses in the form of other targeted killings and mysterious explosions targeting its nuclear and weapons facilities that it has attributed to Israel, it has escaped the crippling effects of a war with Israel precisely because it has availed itself of covert action.
Following the latest covert operation against Hezbollah, the world is again waiting in suspense, fearing the outbreak of a bloody regional war. Like Iran, Hezbollah will have to carefully consider its options if it wants to avoid a war that would undoubtedly devastate it and destroy Lebanon. But, beyond the fact that a large, overt attack in response to covert action would be against both Iran’s and Hezbollah’s interests, it would also represent a grave breach of an unpleasant, yet practical, custom in international relations.
Covert action was a key feature of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. The spectrum of covert operations ran from propaganda and electioneering to paramilitary operations and assassinations. Critically, covert action allowed the two belligerents to compete without resorting to a catastrophic war. It offers the same escape clause today.
Of course, there are always risks associated with covert action. One side will often respond to another’s covert operations with its own, leading to an escalatory shadow war like the one that is currently playing out in the Middle East. Furthermore, technology, leaks, and open-source intelligence have made it more difficult to hide the hand of the actor who conducts a covert operation, so it is easier to assign blame. But blame is not the same thing as proof or an admission of responsibility, and as thin as this defense may sound, the world must weigh the consequences of abandoning covert action norms.
For starters, it is certainly not in America’s interest. Covert action was enshrined in U.S. law following decades of debate and is an indispensable instrument in U.S. national security policy. The U.S. government has conducted its own covert, targeted killing campaign in countries with which it is not at war. In fact, one of the most famous—and least covert—of these operations was the killing of Osama bin Laden. Moreover, the United States has played a part in the ongoing shadow war in the Middle East by working with Israel to conduct covert operations targeting Iran and Hezbollah. For the Biden administration, Israeli covert action, while provocative, is politically preferable to a regional war, which it has worked tirelessly to prevent.
Looking beyond the Middle East, there are greater global security issues at stake in the future of covert action. Even if it only offers “implausible deniability” today, states around the world are still embracing covert action and the ambiguity it creates because it complicates how the other side reacts. A military response that triggers a major war would be an especially dangerous development in the emerging era of great power competition between the United States and China, much of which is taking place in the shadows.
“Blowback” is an old CIA term for the unintended and undesired consequences of covert action. Recent reports have suggested that Israel was waiting to detonate the devices in the event of a war but decided to launch the operation because there were indications Hezbollah was about to discover the plot. Hezbollah may now feel forced to respond in a way that leads to the regional war that all sides have avoided so far. Some commentators are also speculating that the operation could be a prelude to a larger Israeli military campaign against Hezbollah, which may be inevitable anyway. Depending on what happens next, the region could very well suffer blowback—and the rest of the world along with it.
Jeff Rogg is a Senior Research Fellow at the University of South Florida’s Global and National Security Institute. He also sits on the boards of the International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence and the Society for Intelligence History. His book, The Spy and the State: The History of American Intelligence is forthcoming with Oxford University Press in May 2025.
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