Coast Guard inquiry into the Titan implosion resumes with new witness, OceanGate competitor

NORTH CHARLESTON, S.C. (WCBD) – Friday's Titan Marine Board of Investigation public hearing will feature a newly added witness, according to a late-night post from the Coast Guard.

For day four, Former OceanGate Mission Specialist Fred Hagen, University of Washington Applied Physics Lab employee Dave Dyer, Triton Submarines employee Patrick Lahey, and Former OceanGate Contractor Antonella Wilby are on the schedule.

The purpose of the inquiry is to discover everything about why the Titan submersible imploded in June 2023 on its way to the Titanic shipwreck while carrying five passengers.

Thursday featured emotional testimony from a former OceanGate dive passenger whose recounting of an incident differed from the former OceanGate Marine Operations Director's recounting.

Former operation's chief David Lochridge ripped into late OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush, calling him a "control freak" and describing numerous safety violations by his former boss.

Before Lochridge's full day on the witness stand, the former OceanGate Engineering Director Tony Nissen gave similar testimony about how Rush was difficult to disagree with and that if one did, it was "death by a thousand cuts."

LIVE UPDATES:

2:36 p.m.

Lahey said classification is "common sense."

2:23 p.m.

Triton requires customers who buy submersibles keep their subs classed and in it is the buying contract. There is a department at Triton that works solely on submersible classing.

2:22 p.m.

Triton has people who will create Launch and Recovery Systems for their subs.

2:19 p.m.

According to Lahey, the last time someone died on a submersible before Titan was in 1974 or 1973. He explains what happened below:

2:18 p.m.

Triton has built about 30 subs with 4 to 5 in construction now, Lahey said. He estimates Triton subs have been dived on thousands of times.

2:15 p.m.

The hull Lahey viewed in the Bahamas was not the hull used in the implosion. Lahey explains what he thought was wrong when he viewed it, below:

2:14 p.m.

To be a submersible pilot, you can not train one day, he testified.

2:13 p.m.

Lahey had conversations with Rush about certification and classification processes, but Rush disagreed with Lahey's opinions. Lahey said Rush described the process as "an impediment to innovation."

1:55 p.m.

Lahey explains what Triton would have done if they dome had fallen off on of there subs:

1:50 p.m. - 1:52 p.m.

Lahey said all submersibles Triton has tested have not failed pressure system tests and the company would not be doing them if they would fail.

1:49 p.m.

Lahey explains the certification process works and "there is no place for experimental machines in the deep sea."

1:47 p.m.

Lahey did not know the letter was never sent.

1:43 p.m.

The Marine Technology Society drafted a letter for OceanGate detailing concern regarding the Titan. Lahey provides details below. This letter was shared with Stockton Rush by a committee member.

1:42 p.m.

Lahey said Rush knew he did not like what he was doing.

1:38 p.m.

Lahey saw a sub in the Bahamas in 2019. The team happened to see him while he was vacationing there and asked if he wanted to see it. He said he was not impressed with what he saw and told them it looked that the vessel was not ready for deep sea diving.

He also made correction suggestions. He said it was probably in March 2019 that the situation happened. Lahey has never built a submersible with a carbon fiber hull. "The idea of a filament-wound cylinder as a pressure boundary is not a new idea," he testified.

1:37 p.m.

Lahey said OceanGate bought subs he helped create and build. He developed the Cyclops 1 and Antipodes. He became aware of OceanGate around 2015.

1:32 p .m.

Most Triton subs are made from acrylic. Deeper diving subs are made from a different material, however Triton is currently experimenting with creating a deep diving sub made from acrylic.

1:29 p.m.

Lahey explains Triton's drop weight systems:

1:27 p.m.

Training for Triton Submarines buyers includes emergency situation training, Lahey testifies.

1:24 p.m.

Lahey said all subs Triton has made are classed and allowed to dive to original depth, even ones made at the beginning of the company.

1:23 p.m.

The certification process is a process that does not end, according to Lahey. There are annual, periodical, weekly, and monthly maintenance and tests that have to be done for the life of a submersible.

1:21 p.m.

Lahey said innovation has to be done by the standing rules set and current rules set by the classification society allow for innovation.

1:18 p.m.

Lahey said Triton does tests unmanned in a testing chamber. Multiple test cycles are required.

1:17 p.m.

Lahey said everything on a submersible must be tested 1.25 times its diving depth. OceanGate's was tested 1.09 times its diving depth.

1:13 p.m. - 1:15 p.m.

Lahey said classification and certification is fundamental and non-negotiable. He does not believe submersible that are not classified or certified should be operating in the deep sea.

Lahey has never delivered a non-classed, non-certified submersible, he said.

1:11 p.m.

Lahey said Triton builds the deepest diving and most capable subs. All Triton subs are certified and classed with a heavy focus on safety, he said. Lahey said certification is important for safety, durability and client comfort.

1:10 p.m.

Tourist submersibles are not build to a different standard, Lahey testified.

1:09 p.m.

Triton does build tourist carrying submersibles with one that can fit up to 66 people.

1:07 p.m.

A submersible can not regenerate it's own power, a submarine can. Submersibles are built to explore smaller areas and let you go much deeper than a submarine, according to Lahey.

Lahey does not have a merchant mariner credential but he is a licensed Coast Guard pilot for submersibles.

1:02 p.m. -1:06 p.m.

Lahey discusses his professional background. Lahey has worked with submersibles in several different capacities. Triton submersibles was created in 2006.

Triton has sold about 30 subs and built the deepest diving submersibles in the world.

1:01 p.m.

Patrick Lahey called to the witness stand.

11:37 a.m.

Recess call until 1 p.m.

11:24 a.m.

OceanGate and the lab stopped working together in 2017.

11:22 a.m.

Dyer said Rush's vision for OceanGate was research focused and trying to make research expedition more accessible for researchers. He said he changed the development of the company by allowing tourists to dive and going to the Titanic in an effort to provide funding for the company.

10:58 a.m.

Grade 5 titanium rings are a higher strength titanium than grade 3. If you design for grade 5 and you change the grade then you have to account for that in analysis specs, according to Dyer.

10:56 a.m.

Dyer was involved in a dive when the Cyclops 1 had a steel hull but he did not go down. A certification representative was at this dive.

10:54 a.m.

The hull discussed below is the first prototype hull which was from 2015 to 2016.

10:53 a.m.

Using a carbon-fiber hull was "unique" to the industry and the classification society was not closed off to the idea while the lab and OceanGate were still working together, according to Dyer.

10:52 a.m.

When the lab was phased out of the submersible process, OceanGate was allegedly still pursuing the classification process for the submersibles.

10:47 a.m.

Dyer said the lab felt the design for the Titan was heading in the right direction, although is was to early to know what would happen when the lab and OceanGate parted ways. He said the design for the hull was also "no where near complete."

10:45 a.m. - 10: 46 a.m.

Dyer explains the lab's opinion on using glass spheres for the submersibles and why the lab and OceanGate stopped working together.

10:43 a.m. - 10:44 a.m.

Dyer said the OceanGate 2015 to 2016 engineering department was difficult to work with. He said Nissen and the lab started disagreeing was on the fabrication of the dome. He said the reason the lab and OceanGate stopped working together was because of the engineering department.

10:42 a.m.

Boeing was the team that was lead on the real-time monitoring system, according to Dyer and the lab did not analyze the data.

10:41 a.m.

The first 1/3 scale model test, it collapsed and was deemed a "catastrophic failure," according to Dyer.

10:40 a.m.

The last test the lab did was a failed scaled hull test, according to Dyer.

10:35 a.m.

Dyer said you want to make something that is being tested that is not industry standard unmanned when testing.

10:30 a.m.

Dyer said he worked closely with the operations group on Cyclops 1 and in the beginning of Cylops 2. He testified it was a "very good" relationship.

10:27 a.m. -10:29 a.m.

The lab and OceanGate then started working together as need in 2012 to 2013. When the agreement began Cyclops 2 or Titan was conceptual, according to Dyer.

Dyer said the hull was always meant to be 5 to 7 inches. Boeing was the carbon-fiber experts, according to Dyer.

10:26 a.m.

An employee at the University of Washington Applied Physics Lab sought out Rush to use OceanGate's submersibles.

10:23 a.m.

Dyer details his professional background.

10:21 a.m.

Dave Dyer called to testify.

10:03 a.m.

Hagen leaves with a closing statement:

10:00 a.m. - 10:02 a.m.

Paul-Henri Nargeolet, who passed in the Titan implosion, was not an OceanGate employee, according to Hagen and everyone knew that. He was there to be an expert. Hagen said he was a warm guy who was extremely likable.

Even though he was not an OceanGate employee, everyone thought of him as integral to the dives, Hagen said.

9:59 a.m.

Hagen said he knew that if something went wrong on his dive he could die. Everyone on the vessel knew this, according to Hagen.

9:54 a.m.

Hagen would say that he was a member of the mission team when talking to the Canadian authorities.

The Canadian authorities came on the submersible when the team had returned from a dive.

9:40 a.m.

The Titan became "entangled with the wreck of the Titanic" on one dive. Hagen said he didn't think it was a big deal

9:37 a.m. - 9:39 a.m.

Four Canadian authorities went onboard the submersible in "body armor and AR-15's" after Hagen and the team returned from one dive.

9:35 a.m. - 9:37 a.m.

A crane on the support vessel reset the dome on the submersible. Rush initially said the inner team would go on the dive after the down falling off, but Hagen persisted and was allowed.

He testifies Rush was the final decision maker when it came to safety issues.

9:34 a.m.

Hagen saw the dome fall and break off the Titan. He has a picture of it. Hagen was onboard the submersible when the dome fell forward.

9:33 a.m.

Hagen admitted he would break standard rules on the support vessel.

9:32 a.m.

Hagen said he really liked Rush and said he was a visionary whom he admired. The two did have difference of opinions, but they got along fairly well. Hagen said he did have times where he tested his patience.

9:27 a.m.

Hagen said he never personally met David Lochridge but was aware of the concerns he had. He said Lochridge was the "main critic."

He testified there are always general concerns but Lochridge was the main voice. He said another employee told him about Lochridge's concerns.

9:23 a.m. - 9: 26 a.m.

Hagen goes through incidents that occurred while he was on a dive with OceanGate July 3, 2021.

9:20 a.m.

Hagen said he was made aware of OceanGate's previous dives and no one tried to mislead him about the previous trips.

9:14 a.m. - 9:16 a.m.

He wired the funds to his secretary who he assumed would pay for his dives, Hagen testified. He was not aware of a refund policy. He did get a physical beforehand.

9:13 a.m.

Hagen reiterates the Titan diving was not safe, but it was never intended to be that way.

9:12 a.m.

Hagen said it was clear that going down in the Titan was dangerous given it was experimental and it was clear that was the case. He said he was not going down for safety, but going down for an "adrenaline rush."

He testifies Rush was a man who was engaged in a high-risk environment and he did create a strong safety culture given the circumstances.

He said anyone on the ship "including the cook" could abort a mission if they had concerns.

9:08 a.m. - 9:11 a.m.

The dive where a loud bang occurred on the submersible was discussed, and the team determined the fuselage had jumped in its carriage which was the cause, Hagen testified. He said he was satisfied once they told him what had happened while he was on the dive.

9:06 a.m.

Hagen was not reimbursed after the aborted mission where he did not get to the Titanic, however he was allowed to go on another expedition for free.

9:01 a.m.

Hagen describes aborted mission that he was on:

8:58 a.m.

Hagen describes the issue that occurred before the 2021 dive he passengered.

8:57 a.m.

Hagen said OceanGate was not supposed to take mission specialist on the 2021 dive due to a previous issue on another dive, but Hagen persisted and Rush allowed him to go.

8:55 a.m.

Hagen was on two dives that actually ascended, he testified. He said there was a "plethora" of planning meetings scheduled throughout the day.

8:54 a.m.

One of Hagen's jobs was data collection. He was given a list of items to track on the expedition. He also had to perform a safety watch.

8:52 a.m.

Hagen said he does recognize the mission specialist job description sheet.

8:51 a.m.

Hagen performed tasks such as cleaning inside and outside the sub, helping with the oil filled housings and others OceanGate thought were appropriate. He called the tasks he performed "menial."

8:49 a.m.

Mission specialists are not qualified in any way other than payment, Hagen testifies. As a mission specialist he was both a crew member and passenger. He was allowed to participate in the mission such as tightening bolts on the dome, but not he qualified as critical, he said.

8:47 a.m.

Hagen found out about the 2021 Titanic expedition on the Titan and approached an employee saying he wanted to be on the mission.

8:46 a.m.

Hagen called to the stand and asked to go into detail about his professional background.

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