How Far Can Vietnam’s To Lam Push His ‘Palace Coup’ Before Meeting Resistance? – Analysis

By David Hutt

Unlike China under paramount ruler Xi Jinping, the fellow Communist nation of Vietnam is not ruled by a single leader.

For the past four decades, Vietnam has been governed by a "four pillars" system, comprising the Communist Party general secretary, president, prime minister, and the chair of the National Assembly.

This structure — designed to prevent a strongman takeover – has served the one-party state well. Up until now, when the phrase “palace coup” is buzzing around Hanoi.

To Lam, the former public security minister, was elected state president in April after forcing the resignation of his two predecessors, Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Vo Van Thuong, within two years.

He then became general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam in August, following the death of Nguyen Phu Trong, who had held the post since 2012.

As security minister, Lam rose quickly as the enforcer of Trong’s vast anti-corruption campaigns, which have taken down tens of thousands of officials, including much of the senior party hierarchy.

Lam marshaled the “dirty dossiers” on other senior party members; he was given a free hand by Trong to clean up the party, but spent much of his time clearing the path for his own takeover.

He entered the leadership struggle armed with something Trong lacked: control over a formidable institution, the public security ministry. Without such institutional control, Trong depended on persuasion.

Unlike Trong, who was deeply concerned with socialist ethics and personal morality, Lam's focus has been more on regime stability and personal power.

Opportunistic anti-corruption fighter

For Lam, anti-corruption efforts are a tool, not a moral crusade. The Economist recently dubbed him a “hardman, capitalist, hedonist,” referring to an infamous incident in which To Lam wasfilmedeating gold-leaf-flecked steak at a high-end London restaurant.

However, a more fitting term might be “protean,” or even “opportunistic.”

It was telling that former prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung showed up for a private get-together of grandees to celebrate Lam’s appointment as party chief.

For Trong’s circles, Dung is thebête noire, the rent-seeker-in-chief who allowed corruption to run riot and ideology to fall by the wayside.

Trong’s victory over Dung in the 2016 power struggle marked a turning point, allowing him to launch his anti-corruption and ideological campaigns.

Nonetheless, there’s more of Dung than Trong in Lam.

Dung, like Lam a former policeman, was a pragmatist on foreign and economic affairs and opportunistically saw allowing corruption as a way of strengthening a fractured ruling party.

Officials up and down the hierarchy would be bound together by a shared motive of personal enrichment; the central party apparatus could cajole the provinces through patronage chains.

Conversely, Trong proved that anti-corruption was a better way of binding the party, through fear and moral example.

But whereas Trong was respected for living a simple and honest life – living under the conditions he forced on others – the same cannot be said of Lam.

Lam promises that the anti-graft campaign will continue, but without Trong’s moral rectitude, all that’s left is fear.

Systematic purge

As Trong’s health worsened in late 2022, Lam began purging rivals, removing half of the Politburo members selected in 2021. Even Trong’s own protégés were expelled.

Vuong Dinh Hue, who might have succeeded Trong, was discharged as chair of the National Assembly in May. Vo Van Thuong, another contender, was ousted as president in March, replaced by Lam.

Lam’s accumulation of power gained pace thereafter. Now, six of the 15 members of the Politburo, the party’s top decision-making body, come from the public security apparatus.

In June, Lam installed Luong Tam Quang, his protégé and Hung Yen province ally, as the new public security minister and then got him a seat on the Politburo.

Le Minh Hung, now head of the Central Committee’s Organisation Commission and also on the Politburo, is the son of a former public security minister who nurtured Lam’s rise.

Nguyen Duy Ngoc, one of Lam’s public security deputies, became head of the Central Committee Office and was voted onto the Secretariat, a body in charge of the party’s day-to-day affairs.

Other promotions went to family or his “Hung Yen faction” of connections from the northern Red River Delta province near Hanoi. Quang’s father reportedly served as the personal bodyguard to Lam’s father during the Vietnam War.

There has been some pushback against Lam, albeit not successful.

After being appointed president but before becoming party chief, Lam sought to remain public security minister. In response, some party figures tried, but failed, to have Tran Quoc To, the younger brother of former president Tran Dai Quang, a factional leader, installed instead.

Key U.S. trip

The kerfuffle showed Lam that he still must appease other factions of the Communist Party.

On his visit to China in August, before heading to Beijing, Lam paid a pilgrimage to Guangzhou, where a century ago Ho Chi Minh launched the forerunner of the Communist Party of Vietnam. This no doubt pleased the party’s ideologues.

Lam will also visit the U.S. later this month, appeasing the wing of the party that favors closer ties to Washington.

In his first meeting as party chief, he told apparatchiks in the economic ministries and commissions that the anti-graft campaign won’t impact economic development, which it has in recent years.

For all the talk of a “palace coup,” Lam still has rivals, especially from other institutions.

One is the Central Inspection Commission, led by Tran Cam Tu.

Some analysts reckon there is “bad blood” between Lam and Tu and believe that Lam’s recent installation of Vu Hong Van, a police major general who also hails from Hung Yen province, as Tu’s deputy to be his eyes within the institution.

Another institutional rival is the central government apparatus, led by Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, who is himself a former public security official.

Before Trong’s death, Chinh was thought to be Lam’s main rival to take over the party chief role at the next National Congress in early 2026. It’s hard to see anyone dislodging Lam now, but the economic ministries will push back if the “securocrat” takeover of the party hurts the economy.

Eyes on the military

Perhaps the strongest institutional check on Lam’s power is the military, which has long been in competition with his public security ministry.

The military is now the single largest bloc on the Central Committee, accounting for around 13 percent of its members.

This suggests that we might see a new power struggle between the Politburo and Central Committee, as there was when Trong and Dung duked it out a decade ago.

Lam has recently installed some of his Hung Yen faction into key military posts in the north, but there is talk that the military is already testing his resolve.

Earlier this month, allegations began circling that the U.S.-funded Fulbright University Vietnam was teaching courses on regime change.

The allegations started with a military news outlet and were propagated by Force 47, the military’s vast social media troll farm.

The gossip in Hanoi is that the military was trying to whip up anti-U.S. sentiment ahead of Lam’s expected visit to attend the UN General Assembly New York this month. In bilateral meetings there, U.S. officials are expected to push for stronger security cooperation, which not everyone in the military wants.

The first major test of Lam's power will come next month, when the National Assembly is expected to choose a new state president.

It remains unclear whether Lam has been pressured to relinquish one of his two top posts – or if he is willing to give up the largely ceremonial presidential role that requires him to travel abroad, at the expense of working to consolidate his power at home.

Allowing the restoration of the party’s cherished “four pillars” system could be a strategic concession that costs him little but gains favor within the party. Remaining party chief, not president, after 2026 is Lam’s main goal.

Suggestions have been made that retired Gen. Luong Cuong, a permanent member of the Secretariat since May, could be a contender for the presidency.

Defense Minister Phan Van Giang, who received the most "high confidence" votes in the National Assembly’s October 2023 ballot, could also be backed by the military.

Ceding the presidency to the military could serve as a clever way for Lam to appease this powerful institution, but it's also possible that he has his own candidate in mind to maintain his hold on power.

The dynamics of Lam’s power grab will become clearer once the National Assembly makes its decision in October.

• David Hutt is a research fellow at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) and the Southeast Asia Columnist at the Diplomat. He writes the Watching Europe In Southeast Asia newsletter. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of RFA.