Beyond Response: J&K Needs Proactive Strategies For Counter-Terrorism – Analysis

By Sameer Patil and Ayjaz Wani

Terrorist violence, it appears, is making a comeback in Jammu & Kashmir after a lull of a few months. A series of terrorist attacks and encounters in the Jammu region in the last few weeks have led to fears that militancy, which had been in its final gasps, has come back stronger to target the security forces operating in the region.

It all began on 9 June 2024, wheninsurgents attacked a bus carrying pilgrims in Reasi, killing 10 and injuring 33. Two days later, six soldiers were wounded in twin attacks in Doda and Kathua. On 7 July, one army personnel was injured when terrorists attacked asecurity post in the Rajouri-Poonch area. Another attack followed on 8 July, when heavily armed terrorists killed five soldiers, including a Junior Commissioned Officer and injured six in the Kathua district. Last week, in the Doda district, four army soldiers, an officer and a J&K Police (JKP) officer were killed during an encounter. The Jaish-e-Mohammed-linked shadow groups, theKashmir TigersandPeople’s Anti-Fascist Front,have claimed responsibility for these attacks.

These attacks south of Pir Panjal assume significance as, since 2019, the security grid has been largely successful in combating terrorist violence in the Kashmir valley. A noticeable change in the attitude of the Kashmiri youth accompanies this reduction in terrorist violence. This was evident by the active participation of youth in the recently held Lok Sabha elections, which saw a58 percentvoter turnout in the Union Territory. These changed dynamics are putting pressure on Pakistan and the terrorist organisations based there to alter their geographic and tactical approaches to remain relevant.

Post-2019 crackdown

After August 2019, security agencies focused on the terrorist strongholds of South Kashmir, which had become the hotbed of militancy. With a robust security grid, they largely succeeded in cracking down on terrorist networks and eliminated several terrorists.

The crackdown included explicitly targeting terror funding and individuals supporting or harbouring terrorists, including the Over Ground Workers (OGWs) and cadres ofJamaat-e-Islami(JeI). This Hizbul Mujahideen-linked religious organisation had spread its network far and wide in the Valley. According to the data provided by the security forces, between 2019 and 2021, the JKP arrested more than900 OGWsunder the Public Safety Act and Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. In addition, the National Investigation Agencylaunchedseveral investigations into terrorist financing cases. These uncovered a deep nexus between the Pakistan Army’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and terrorist organisations.

Meanwhile, the pressure on terrorist organisations continued through counter-insurgency operations that targeted top militant leaders.Between 2021 and 2023, security forces eliminated as many as 443 terrorists, including 127 foreign terrorists (as shown in Figure 1).

As a result of these actions, there was a dip in local terrorist recruitment after 2021. In2022, only100local youthjoined terrorist organisations. This came down to merely 25 in 2023. At present,security agenciesestimatethe presence of around 110 foreign and 27 local terrorists in J&K.

These circumstances also changed the local youth’s perception of Pakistan. There was a realisation that Islamabad haddeceived generations of Kashmirisby exploiting religion and engaging in illegal activities like narcotics smuggling to fund insurgency in the Valley.

From Kashmir valley to Jammu

With security agencies gaining the upper hand in the Valley, Pakistan changed its tactics and geography to sustain insurgency and consequently maintain a global focus on Kashmir.Since 2021, terrorist attacks have mostly occurred south of Pir Panjal and have been mainly carried out by foreign terrorists who utilised complex terrain anddense foreststo ambush the security forces. In 2023 and 2024 (till June), 43 and 24terror attacksoccurred in the Jammu region respectively, claiming the lives of 48 Army personnel.

Pakistan is also exploring new mechanisms for infiltration, like porous international borders and riverine areas in the Jammu sector rather than the Line of Control (LoC) in the north. Security forces have noted that the infiltrating terrorists, gathering in groups of four to five, have used tactics of conservation and consolidation, i.e., staying quiet for some time and blending with the local population before carrying out attacks. Security forces also note the proliferation of equipment likeM4 carbine assault rifles, night vision goggles along withhighly encrypted telecom equipment(Chinese customised equipment that is usually used by Pak Army troops). In addition, terrorists are using encrypted messaging platforms and social media apps likeTelegram, Tam Tam, Mastodon, Chirpwire, Enigma, etc., along with virtual private networks, which are already banned in Rajouri and Poonch districts.

However, the region’s security grid,particularly in the Rajouri and Poonch districts,was weakened because some security forces werereassignedto the eastern Ladakh sector to deal with the Chinese aggression. Terrorist organisations exploited this opportunity to target security forces, ultimately contributing to the recent surge.

Adopting proactive counter strategies 

Containing this bout of terrorist violence in Jammu is imperative, as its persistence can undo the gains made post-August 2019 in the region.

Restoring the security grid in the region must be the priority, especially in the terror-hit border districts of Kathua, Doda, Rajouri and Poonch. For this purpose, experienced Army and Police officials from the Kashmir Valley should be deployed in the region, with a mandate not only to redesign the anti-terror grid but also to create much-needed inter-agency synergy.

Moreover, given the adoption of an ambush style of attack by foreign terrorists, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and JKP’s Special Operations Group (SOG) can form joint teams to counter such attacks effectively. For example, CRPF’s COBRA Commandos, known for their jungle and guerrilla warfare experience, can be teamed up with SOG personnel, some of whom have combat experience from the peak militancy decade of 2000-2010 in the Pir Panjal and Chenab belt region. In addition, the Army should leverage its strengths to dominate the heights, increase vigilance along the LoC, and tighten border security. Improving inter-agency coordination between the Army, CRPF, Border Security Force, and JKP is crucial.

Subsequently, the security forces must opt for additional counter-insurgency training to develop new strategies. In the last seven or eight years, most counter-insurgency operations have been successfully executed using TECHINT-based information. However, terrorists are now using encrypted apps and online activity to mislead security agencies. Therefore, agencies must reinforce HUMINT to complement TECHINT. Creating a network of informants won’t be easy as intelligence agencies worked against each other’s assets after 2019, taking most of the sources out of the system.

Significantly, it is not just the hard measures that will help the security forces; soft measures, too, can go a long way in avoiding losing the locals’ trust. The forces can replicate some of the soft measures the Army has initiated in the Valley. This becomes even more critical from the information warfare viewpoint, something which the ISI’s propaganda machinery has amplified vis-à-vis Kashmir post-August 2019.

About the authors:

• Sameer Patil is Senior Fellow with the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology and Deputy Director at Observer Research Foundation.
• Ayjaz Wani is a Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation