US-Pakistan cooperation has historically thrived during periods of military rule in Islamabad, with little lasting benefit for either country.

There is a strong sense of déjà vu among Pakistan-watchers these days. The country is on the verge of a rerun of the 1958 military coup. Field Marshal Asim Munir, the second to hold such an exalted rank in Pakistan’s history, struts around the political and military stage with his political minions, including Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.

The newly minted field marshal’s powers were expanded and consolidated recently by a constitutional amendment that extended his control over all branches of the armed forces as the chief of defense forces. While ostensibly meant to “ensure greater coordination and unified command” among the three services, in reality, this is a consolidation of his authority over the political system. The amendment also provides Field Marshal Munir with lifelong legal immunity for all acts of omission or commission.

Field Marshal Munir’s popularity had risen to new heights during and after the brief and inconclusive war with India in May. The servile media portrayed him as the “savior” of Pakistan in the face of Indian “aggression.” No one raised questions about the Pakistani army’s alleged complicity with the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Pahalgam in April that led to the Indian retaliation next month.

Pakistan’s History of Military Dictatorship

The glorification of the army chief and the military establishment stems from the perception that the military is the only institution holding the country together in the face of the Baluchistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa regional insurgencies, terrorist attacks attributed to the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and a chaotic civilian parliament.

Pakistan has been under direct military rule for half its existence. Even during periods of civilian control, the government remains crucially dependent on military support and allows Rawalpindi to set foreign and defense policy. Imran Khan, who came to power with the blessing of the military high command in 2018, ran afoul of these rules and was forced out of office in 2022. He was jailed the following year.

The last military dictator to rule the country was General Pervez Musharraf, who governed from 1999 to 2008 until the military brass decided that he had become a liability and decided to return to civilian rule. However, the military continued to pull the strings from behind the scenes, and whenever the civilian government stepped out of line, it was maneuvered out of power, as was the case with both Nawaz Sharif in 2017 and Imran Khan in 2022.

The current government, led by Shehbaz Sharif, has learnt this lesson very well and has paid due deference to the views of the army chief. The façade of civilian rule will remain as long as this state of affairs exists.

US-Pakistan Relations: Back to the Future

Last June, in an unprecedented move, President Trump hosted Field Marshal Munir at the White House for a one-on-one lunch. In September, he accompanied Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif to a meeting with President Trump. In October, Trump, while meeting Sharif at the Gaza Peace Summit in Egypt, lavished praise on Munir by calling him his “favorite Field Marshal.” Trump clearly understands where the real power in Pakistan lies. 

The flirtations with the field marshal recall the Eisenhower administration’s admiration for General (later Field Marshal) Ayub Khan, even before he usurped power in 1958. Khan was perceived in Washington as a straight-talking, anti-communist soldier who, in his own words, did not believe in “hunting with the hound and running with the hare,” like non-aligned India. He helped bring Pakistan into SEATO and CENTO, the two alliances formed in the 1950s to contain the Soviet Union and Communist China. Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles characterized Ayub Khan as “a firm friend of the West” and compared him very favorably to Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Not long after joining the alliances, Khan cozied up to Mao Zedong.

Now, Field Marshal Asim Munir has sought to position himself as Washington’s most trusted friend in the strategic and resource-rich tri-junction of Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. Once again, this perception persists despite repeated proclamations by Pakistani leaders that they consider China—America’s principal adversary—Pakistan’s only “all-weather” friend.

The current administration’s fascination with Pakistan stands in sharp contrast to Trump’s declaration during his first term that the United States had “foolishly” given Pakistan billions in military aid and received nothing but “lies and deceit.” He followed up by cutting off security aid to Pakistan over its continued support for the Taliban insurgency while ostensibly cooperating with the United States and allied efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.

What changed? 

First, the Taliban in power have shown themselves to be no friends of Pakistan since 2021. Moreover, the terrorist threat to Western interests in the region now emanates not from the Taliban but the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), which is also the Taliban’s principal enemy within Afghanistan. Washington feels that, given Islamabad’s role in bringing the Taliban to power, it can help root out IS-K from Afghanistan.

Second, given the recent deterioration in Pakistan’s relations with Iran, Washington assumes that it is a potential partner in curtailing Iranian influence in the region as part of a loose coalition including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel.

Third, Pakistan has cleverly dangled the carrot of a deep seaport in the Arabian Sea before American eyes. The proposed location is Pasni in Baluchistan province, about 70 miles from the port of Gwadar, which China is developing. Field Marshal Munir’s advisors floated the idea, obviously with his blessing, that Pasni could serve as a commercial terminal to export critical minerals to the United States. 

This offer is especially attractive to Washington since China has put severe restrictions on the export of rare earth minerals to the United States in retaliation for US tariffs. Pasni also has strategic attractions for the United States, given its proximity to Iran and China’s Gwadar port, as well as its potential for access to the mineral- and energy-rich Central Asia.

Fourth, Washington recognizes Pakistan’s value as an interlocutor with Middle Eastern regimes, especially Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms. This perception was reinforced by the Saudi-Pakistan defense pact signed last September. Senior Pakistani officials have also declared that Pakistan will extend its nuclear deterrent to Saudi Arabia. Washington assumes that this close Pakistan-Saudi nexus could help it persuade Riyadh to recognize Jerusalem and join the Abraham Accords.

Why Pakistan Can’t Help the United States

Washington needs to recognize the limitations on its developing relationship with Pakistan, and especially with Field Marshal Munir. First, events of the past few weeks have made it clear that Pakistan does not influence the Taliban. Its relations with Afghanistan are on a downward slope, and the two countries engaged in a short border war last month. Moreover, there are obvious signs of a distinct tilt in the Taliban’s policy in favor of India, Pakistan’s arch-nemesis. Therefore, to expect Pakistan to influence Afghanistan’s policy on any issue appears unrealistic.

Second, the Pasni port proposal is an exceedingly long shot. Given Pakistan’s economic and military dependence on China, including massive Chinese investments in the Belt and Road Initiative, it is hard to believe that the proposed idea would move beyond the realm of conjecture within any reasonable time frame. Chinese weapons, especially aircraft, saw successful use for the first time in the war with India in May, further cementing the China-Pakistan relationship. It is therefore unlikely that Islamabad will defy Beijing’s wishes on an issue of strategic importance.

Moreover, the unsettled situation in Baluchistan, where a secessionist insurgency has been raging for years, should make Washington think twice about getting involved. The Chinese are already paying the price of the Gwadar venture, with Baluchi insurgents conducting deadly attacks on Chinese citizens.

Third, traditionally, the Saudi-Pakistan relationship has been an unequal one, with Pakistan dependent on Saudi largesse. Expectations that Islamabad might influence Riyadh’s policy toward Israel in the absence of meaningful movement on the issue of Palestinian self-determination, an issue critical to the legitimacy of the Saudi regime, are unfounded.

Finally, the United States is likely to bitterly regret putting all its eggs in the field marshal’s basket. Although a succession of military dictators has ruled the country, their reigns all ended in ignominy. 

Ayub Khan was ousted in disgrace in 1968 after months of street protests in both wings of the country. His successor, Yahya Khan, came to an even more ignominious end in 1971 following the Pakistani military’s humiliating defeat at the hands of India and the secession of Bangladesh. President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq died in a plane crash in 1988, the circumstances of which remain a mystery. His regime immediately unraveled soon after. President Musharraf was forced to resign and flee in 2008 as a result of a lawyer’s movement that morphed into a mass protest against military rule.

The record suggests that direct military rule in Pakistan is inherently unstable. While Pakistan under nominal civilian rule may appear chaotic, military rule leads to disaster. External supporters of military dictators also face negative consequences when such dictators are overthrown.

Even amid chummy relations between President Munir and President Trump, anti-American feelings in Pakistan are still prevalent. Pakistanis see the United States, in contrast with China, as an unreliable ally that uses Pakistan for its own ends and refuses to help it in times of crisis. Whatever the United States hopes to gain from a militarist rerun in Pakistan won’t be worth it in the long term. 

About the Author: Mohammed Ayoob

Mohammed Ayoob is University Distinguished Professor Emeritus of International Relations at Michigan State University, and the author, most recently, of From Regional Security to Global IR: An Intellectual Journey (2024).

Image: The White House / Wikimedia Commons / Public Domain.

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