The Perils of an “Iran-Centric” Policy in Lebanon
The Perils of an “Iran-Centric” Policy in Lebanon
There is much to lose in treating Lebanon as a clone of Syria.
Recent developments have made it abundantly clear that the Trump administration’s policy towards Lebanon is driven almost exclusively by an obsession to curtail Iran’s regional influence.
A high-level American delegation recently visited Beirut and held talks with Lebanese political leaders that focused on stopping Iranian funding for Hezbollah. The delegation was led by White House Senior Director for Counterterrorism Sebastian Gorka and included senior officials from the Treasury Department.
Statements made by members of the delegation stood out in their emphasis on the Iranian factor.
“Lebanon has suffered long enough under the wicked influence of Iran,” wrote Gorka on his X account following a meeting with the Lebanese President Joseph Aoun.
Meanwhile, Undersecretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John Hurley—another delegation member—emphasized that Lebanon’s well-being was tied to excluding Iran from the country which could only be accomplished through cutting Iranian funding from its Lebanese ally.
“We think the key for the Lebanese people getting their country back is ending the malign influence of Iran through Hezbollah in Lebanon,” Hurley told a small group of journalists at the American embassy in Beirut, stressing that the Trump administration was “very serious about cutting off Iran’s funding” to the Lebanese Shiite movement.
Earlier, Hurley stated that disarming Hezbollah was inextricably linked to diminishing Iranian influence in Lebanon and blocking the financial pipeline from Tehran to its Lebanese ally: “The key to that [the disarmament of Hezbollah] is to drive out the Iranian influence and control that starts with all the money that they are pumping into Hezbollah.”
That the delegation was headed by Gorka further supports the notion that Washington is pursuing an Iranian-centric approach towards Lebanon. Often referred to as an Islamophobe, Gorka more precisely fits the description of an “Iranophobe,” having publicly stated that Iran poses a more dangerous threat than Salafi-jihadi groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda, a line of argument often emphasized by Israeli officials.
Perhaps more importantly Gorka’s boss at the National Security Council is Marco Rubio, who is also Trump’s secretary of state. According to media reports, Rubio’s influence over Trump has risen exponentially, as evidenced by Trump’s warmongering posture towards Venezuela.
At the same time, he is an ardent Iran hawk.
The end of the Assad dynasty in Syria perhaps best helps explain why Washington is so determined to expel Iran from Lebanon by cracking down on Hezbollah. What happened in Syria was a strategic setback for Iran; that country was Tehran’s closest regional state ally. From an anti-Iran geopolitical standpoint, proceeding to quickly capitalize on the momentum generated by the power change in Syria by tightening the screws on Hezbollah makes perfect sense, not least given how arms shipments from Iran to its Lebanese ally via Syria have been virtually cut off.
As tempting as this may appear to Iran hawks, it ignores the complexity of the sectarian dynamics involved. As Lebanon’s latest municipal elections and recent polls reveal, Hezbollah continues to enjoy broad support amongst Lebanese Shiites, who comprise the country’s single largest religious sect. It would be wrong to assume that this support stems solely or even mainly from social and economic services the group provides.
Rather, security concerns are a major factor behind Lebanese Shiite support for Hezbollah. This owes to the fact that a large segment of Lebanon’s Shiite community now sees itself confronting a twin threat: one from the southern border with Israel, and the other from the eastern border with Syria under the leadership of Ahmad al-Sharaa. According to Michael Young of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, the Sharaa regime is considered by Lebanese Shiites an even greater menace than Israel.
While there exists no official data to support this assessment, it is safe to say that the power change in Syria adds a major layer of security concerns for Lebanon’s Shiite population.
In the contemporary Salafi-jihadi schools of thought—to which al-Sharaa previously belonged but has since claimed to have abandoned—reserve a special hatred for Shiites that is rooted in ideology.
Al-Sharaa’s pronouncements of disengaging from his Salafi-Jihadi past have done little to allay Lebanese Shiite fears. On the contrary, the mass killings of Alawite and Druze minorities—both of whom are close to Shiites—in post-Assad Syria have exacerbated these fears.
Paradoxically then, while Assad’s ouster dealt a serious blow to Hezbollah, it also has the effect of solidifying its Shiite support, increasing the likelihood that any hasty attempts to forcefully disarm the group will end up triggering sectarian strife.
Most concerningly, Trump officials have declared that the Sharaa regime will be an active partner against Hezbollah, among other Washington-designated terrorist groups.
“Damascus will now actively assist us in confronting and dismantling the remnants of ISIS, the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), Hamas, Hizballah, and other terrorist networks”, wrote U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack, who is also special envoy to Syria, on his X account, following Sharaa’s visit to Washington.
Not only does this further feed Lebanese Shiite fears, it also creates a real danger of Lebanon witnessing something similar to what unfolded in Syria during the conflict in that country. Salafi-jihadi groups saw in the sectarian dimension of the Syrian conflict, which pitted Alawites against Sunnis, a golden opportunity to pursue their agenda. This ultimately led to the creation of the ISIS terrorist group under its then-leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Recruiting the Sharaa regime against Hezbollah raises the specter of a similar scenario in Lebanon, as this would effectively pit Sunnis against Shiites.
Washington pundits have argued that the new regime in Syria is better than its predecessor, notwithstanding Sharaa’s Salafi-jihadi background, citing the former President Bashar al-Assad’s close alliance with Russia and Iran.
Based on this argument, the chaos of the Syrian conflict—including the rise of Salafi-Jihadi groups—was worth it, as it ended up disposing a close ally of American geopolitical rivals and bringing Syria into the U.S. orbit, as evidenced by Sharaa’s Washington visit.
But while it could be argued that the power change in Syria served U.S. interests from a geopolitical perspective regardless of the events that led to this outcome (though this is debatable, to say the least), it would be a mistake to apply this logic to Lebanon.
Historically Syria was a Soviet ally before also building close ties with Iran, hence its pivot towards the United States is of major geopolitical significance. By contrast Lebanon, as a state, has never been closely allied with U.S. rivals, notwithstanding the Iran–Hezbollah alliance.
Rather, Lebanon has been traditionally close to the United States and continues to be. Experts have noted that American security assistance to Lebanon is one of the largest assistance programs worldwide, with military aid to Lebanon amounting to over $3 billion since 2006.
But perhaps the best reflection of close bilateral state-to-state ties is the new embassy compound being built in Beirut. The compound—which was planned years back—will likely be Washington’s second largest embassy in the world, behind the Baghdad embassy.
The United States therefore has much to lose if Lebanon were to descend into sectarian chaos resulting from hasty action to end Iranian influence in the country through sidelining Hezbollah.
The post The Perils of an “Iran-Centric” Policy in Lebanon appeared first on The American Conservative.