But Trump’s plan is unlikely to accomplish its stated aims.
Though the extent of the damage on the targeted facilities is still being assessed, it appears the strikes did not significantly damage either meaningful elements of Iran’s nuclear materials or its production infrastructure. Permanently crippling Iranian nuclear facilities is not a one-and-done operation—destroying them would require multiple waves of attack, meaning an open-ended U.S. military operation over Iranian airspace. While strikes on individual facilities can set back the program, they cannot permanently eliminate it; the program is widely dispersed across a plethora of known—and likely unknown—facilities. In fact, several reports suggest Trump gave Iran advance notice and most of the enriched uranium stockpiled at these facilities was evacuated prior to the strikes. American officials admitted after the attacks they don’t know the whereabouts of Iran’s uranium stockpiles. Additionally, the research and development advancements Iran has made since Trump scrapped the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) cannot be bombed away. If Trump’s goal was destroying Iran’s nuclear program to the point it cannot be rebuilt, these strikes did not accomplish that.
Nor are these strikes likely to force Iran back to the negotiating table or capitulate on key demands such as domestic enrichment. Even if a diplomatic offramp still exists and can be seized, Iran will almost certainly not back down from its demands in negotiations. Increased pressure from the U.S. has historically hardened Tehran’s position while undermining more moderate voices. Sensing that regime change could be on the horizon, Tehran could in fact view a nuclear weapon as a necessary deterrent. If Trump’s goal was to make Iran yield in negotiations, his strikes have likely made that more difficult.
Two other factors will be critical to how this conflict develops: how Iran responds and how Israel proceeds.
In the best-case scenario, Tehran responds with symbolic military action similar to what it did following the U.S. assassination of Qasem Soleimani in 2020. Iran has not rejected a return to negotiations outright. In the worst-case scenario, Iran responds through meaningful force against American interests, prompting a forceful U.S. response in turn. Iran and its partners may target American troops currently scattered across 63 bases spanning the Middle East, or Iran could retaliate by targeting maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz—scenarios that could quickly spiral out of control. Escalation of this sort would increase pressure on Trump for a military response and probably be a death knell for diplomacy.
Washington ceding the initiative to Netanyahu also risks steering Trump in a direction anathema to U.S. interests. Israel’s attacks were not about preempting an imminent threat, but rather a deliberate attempt to sabotage ongoing American diplomacy with Iran. For Netanyahu, the main problem is the Iranian regime. For him, any nuclear deal with Tehran is viewed as a form of appeasement and must be opposed because it would block the path to regime-change.
Netanyahu launched his attack under the dubious pretext of preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon—a narrative Trump has now embraced to justify strikes. But the breadth of Israel’s attack shows this extends far beyond the nuclear issue. Instead, it was an opening salvo to a conflict Netanyahu hopes will result in U.S.-led regime change—something the prime minister has lobbied Washington to pursue for almost three decades. Trump’s current strategy neglects Netanyahu’s incentive to further escalate the war and draw the United States deeper into the conflict. Convincing Trump to strike Iranian nuclear facilities was his way to drag the U.S. into the war as an active participant.
The United States has no strategic interest in facilitating Israel’s war with Iran or in going to war with the Islamic Republic. Though the U.S. military is already assisting Israel in intercepting drones and missiles fired from Iran, the longer Israel’s military campaign continues, the more likely an expansion of the war or rising costs for Israel will force the United States to increase its involvement. War between the United States and Iran would be disastrous for American interests and for the Middle East. Iran’s defense doctrine is centered on bogging down would-be invaders in a prolonged war of attrition. This would result in heavy U.S. casualties while draining the United States of critical resources at a time when it is increasingly overextended abroad. For the Middle East, such a war would devour the region, destabilizing it politically, economically, and militarily. The profound human and material costs would plague the Middle East for generations to come.
It doesn’t have to be this way. The position the United States finds itself in is courtesy of an American Middle East policy that has spun out of control. Decades of deep American engagement in the region and status quo thinking has produced one disaster after another. The problem begins in Washington—specifically, a bipartisan inability to recognize that the problems we face in the Middle East are a product of our own presence, partners, and policies in the region.
Washington is on a path to repeat these failures once again.