Beyond Rhetoric: Passing the Afghan Adjustment Act
Introduction
The time to support our Afghan Special Forces partners through legislation and affirm their pathways to long-term stability in the U.S. is well overdue. Three years after Afghanistan’s collapse and the chaotic 2021 evacuation, Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) veterans in the U.S. remain in immigration limbo. Those in the U.S. have lived under the uncertainty of a Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation for three years. Those who could not escape remain trapped in Afghanistan, vulnerable to exploitation by other countries, or forced to attempt harrowing journeys to the U.S. border. In a period of renewed great power competition (GPC) and geopolitical instability, international security partnerships and the ability to leverage regional, cultural, and tactical expertise are crucial elements of effective American national security policy. ANASOC veterans provide an invaluable recruiting pool with proven abilities to perform at high levels in challenging tactical environments alongside U.S. military forces. The U.S. has so far failed to capitalize on the opportunity ANASOC veterans present: well-trained, vetted, and driven military partners with intimate knowledge of the geography and customs of Southwest Asia, and as a means through which to signal strategic competitors and existing and potential allies of America’s steadfast commitment to its security partners. Establishing a clear path to Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) eligibility through passing the Afghan Adjustment Act (AAA) benefits U.S. national security and a deserving partner.
ANASOC and The Afghan Adjustment Act
ANASOC veterans were a key NATO partner in Afghanistan, operating alongside U.S. and NATO Special Operations Forces (SOF) for over a decade in the fight against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Founded in 2012 and fashioned after U.S. Special Operations units, ANASOC veterans were committed to rebuilding and protecting their country. As one soldier put it in an interview with the Corioli Institute, “I was doing it for a purpose…for my own people, for my own nation, for my own values, for the democracy that was helping us…”. ANASOC units were capable forces in their own right, at times conducting the majority of Afghan military missions and performing some of the most dangerous operations despite their small size relative to the whole force. ANASOC’s responsibilities included conducting “precision short-duration military special operations” including “direct action, hostage rescue, special reconnaissance, and counter-insurgency tasks” and “precision, short-duration military special operations beyond the range, scope, and capability of conventional ANA units.” In many locations, ANASOC units were the last Afghan forces fighting off the Taliban advance. After thousands of American and Afghan lives were lost across conventional and special operations forces, billions of dollars were spent, and nearly a decade of partnership with ANASOC, our partners were left to battle their way through the country they defended for a chance at evacuation. The few who made it to the U.S. have still not found lasting safety and remain burdened with uncertain immigration futures for three years and counting.
The Afghan Adjustment Act is a bipartisan bill that would make ANASOC veterans and other vetted Afghan military veterans eligible for SIVs if they receive a recommendation from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). The DOD review and recommendation process includes a review of the ANASOC service record and DOD data holdings, including biometric and fingerprint records, to confirm identities and identify any derogatory information, such as misrepresented service records or ties to illicit organizations. This process is meant to calm some congressional concerns regarding the standard of vetting and the potential to abuse the system. The bill currently remains stagnant in the Senate Judiciary Committee, where it has sat untouched for fifteen months. Though the bill has seventeen bipartisan co-sponsors, some Senators have voiced concerns about its “lack of parole reform” and “protections for Afghans…who did not work with U.S. forces”, as well as the “potential for abuse of virtually unlimited and unvetted family migration.” Though some challenges are legitimate, the bill does not provide for overall reform of humanitarian parole or temporary protected status, the concerns about abuse and overuse should be negated by the vetting process. Additionally, the bill explicitly lays out who is eligible to apply, cutting off instances of abuse. More recently, efforts to tie portions of the bill to border reform and security supplementals have fallen short. As we enter the 119th Congress, the bill must be reintroduced to the legislative process, and the likelihood of our ANASOC partners promptly achieving long-term safety and stability continues to dwindle. SIV status would ensure our Afghan partners, who sacrificed for their country and ours, are protected from deportation or the elimination of their temporary protected status. Additionally, this status would enable ANASOC veterans, many of whom expressed their desire to join the U.S. military during interviews with the Corioli Institute, facilitated by Honor the Promise, to pursue further military service if they choose. The U.S. spent over $2.3 trillion on the war in Afghanistan; comparatively, the AAA is a fiscally minuscule commitment to our deserving partners. Timely approval and implementation of the AAA honors America’s promise to our Afghan partners to stand by them “just as they stood with us.” In passing the AAA into law, America also demonstrates our unbending commitment to support global security partners beyond rhetorical assurances once a conflict ends.
National Security Imperative
The US National Security Strategy, published by the Biden administration in 2022, highlights the importance of building and maintaining U.S. security alliances and partnerships, claiming they are “our most important strategic asset”. The concept of global partnerships as vital to U.S. national security is bipartisan; even administrations perceived as the most isolationist amplify their importance. For example, the Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy stated, “Allies and partners magnify our power.”
The U.S. faces an uncertain international arena with multiple active or potential conflicts. At the same time, would-be peer adversaries are growing in material power and deliberately violating and encroaching upon international norms. veterans can partner with the U.S. in new capacities. Afghanistan again risks becoming a front-page issue as the security situation deteriorates and terrorist organizations have increased freedom to plan and operate. Opening SIV pathways to ANASOC veterans and enabling their reported desire to “work and try (special operations) again” is a unique opportunity to tap their expertise. As the threat from Afghan-based terror groups rises, integrating ANASOC veterans and their expertise into military or advisory roles presents a national security opportunity to seize.
In an era of renewed GPC with China and Russia, America’s continued ability to achieve its national security objectives requires regional partners willing to stand alongside the U.S. to challenge nefarious and belligerent state and non-state actors, and cooperate economically, militarily, and politically. To succeed in GPC, the U.S. must foster a deep and reliable bench of partners and allies. Failing to support Afghan special operations partner forces after a multi-decade military campaign will undermine America’s commitment to its allies and raise the fear of abandonment should the US lose interest in supporting a partner in a regional conflict. To alleviate this potential crisis of American legitimacy and influence, Congress need only support existing legislation and demonstrate its commitment to those Afghans who fought alongside American and NATO forces in pursuit of peace and stability in Afghanistan. its back on a stalwart special operations partner from America’s longest foreign war may irreparably damage US credibility amongst its allies and negatively impact the ability to generate and sustain future security partnerships. These national security partnerships will be strong and sustainable if rhetorical assurances are supported by demonstrable actions. In this case, protecting and supporting ANASOC by passing the AAA into law.
Failing to protect ANASOC can have implications for years to come and impact various national security areas of concern, even beyond Afghanistan. Russia and China seized on the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan to paint the U.S. as weakened and unreliable. They will almost certainly seize an opportunity to reemphasize these points and sow doubt about ‘Western’ dependability while painting the U.S. as a hegemon unconcerned with the long-term well-being of its partners. This alone may not drive potential partners away, but it weaves neatly into an increasingly pervasive narrative of the U.S. interfering with the affairs of other countries while abandoning allies.
As many growing and developing countries, especially in Africa and Latin America, are pressured to walk a tightrope between the U.S. and China or Russia for economic, military, and political cooperation, the U.S. can ill-afford to be labeled a precarious ally. The AAA provides a tangible example useful for countering malign narratives, proving long-term dependability to potential allies, and showing that a partnership with the U.S. is not only rhetorical but also persists through challenges. Signaling reliability as an ally for future military partnerships is just one area in a wide-ranging GPC arena where supporting ANASOC veterans will pay off. From intelligence sharing to critical mineral management and international technological development, the U.S. and its current partners will need to foster new relationships and sustain existing ones if we are to succeed in a new era of GPC. These relationships will all have implications for national security, and signing the AAA into law is a cost-effective and imperative step in the right direction to ensure the U.S. and its allies are positioned for success.
Doing the Right Thing
Three years after the collapse of the Afghan government and the withdrawal of its international partners, Afghanistan remains inhospitable for many. Humanitarian protections are nonexistent, especially for those who worked for or on behalf of the U.S. If ANASOC veterans returned to Afghanistan, their lives would be in certain danger. Verified reports indicate that the Taliban regime continues a campaign to hunt down and punish our partners. Those who escaped to the U.S. were forced to make impossible decisions about leaving their families, homes, and the country they fought for behind.
Some may worry that providing SIV pathways to ANASOC veterans incentivizes future partners searching for migration pathways. However, the AAA is explicitly for those “who supported the U.S. mission in Afghanistan”, and takes care to outline eligible groups. The convoluted path of joining a foreign military to possibly immigrate to the U.S. offers a slim chance at success, with the opportunity historically reserved for extreme circumstances. Also, there are pathways to the U.S. beyond joining a partner military, including joining the U.S. military as a legal immigrant. The extreme circumstances of a Taliban takeover, government and military collapse, and chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan present a situation necessitating SIV pathways for ANASOC veterans.
Unfortunately, these at-risk partners remain uncertain of their immigration outcomes and ability to stay in the U.S. under legal protections, and thus cannot pursue their new lives fully. ANASOC veterans have clear ties to the U.S. and have earned an SIV pathway similar to Afghan translators. The Afghan Adjustment Act is the answer. The legislation will die at the end of this Congress, time is running short, and we must act now to honor our promise to our Afghan Special Operations partners.
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