What Tory leadership candidates should learn from the mistakes of Boris Johnson – and Silvio Berlusconi
The Conservative party is choosing a new leader, with four candidates still in the running: Kemi Badenoch, James Cleverly, Robert Jenrick and Tom Tugendhat. Each is pitching to a party in dire need of a new direction and the path ahead is far from clear.
Our recent research suggests the candidates could learn a lot from two phenomenally successful party leaders of the recent past in the weeks ahead – but probably more in terms of what not to do.
We’ve looked at Silvio Berlusconi, who was prime minister of Italy three times between 1994 and 2011, and Boris Johnson, more briefly prime minister of the UK from 2019 to 2022. Both were unusual politicians, media-driven leaders who dominated with a combination of three “Ps”:-personalisation, performance and populism.
As political celebrities they used, and manipulated, the media to create unending controversy (much easier for Berlusconi as he owned such a large part of it). It appeared that their approach paid off at the ballot box. Berlusconi won three elections and reshaped Italian politics, while Johnson won the largest Conservative majority since Margaret Thatcher.
Yet for all their apparent power and opportunity, Berlusconi and Johnson delivered little lasting change. Both promised national rejuvenation, whether a “new Italian miracle” or “levelling up”. They left office leaving little more than a series of unfulfilled promises in their wake.
The four remaining Tory candidates have each displayed signs of the three Ps. With a selectorate of party members to woo, each has sought to appeal to the populist right on immigration and relations with Europe. Badenoch and Jenrick have created personalising appeals based somewhat bizarrely on manufactured working class credentials. With little attention being paid to the contest, candidates have been trying to muscle in on the news agenda in the hope of making an impact.
This path may make matters worse for the Conservatives. Johnson and Berlusconi used the media to play at being spontaneous and gaffe prone, making themselves seem authentic and anti-establishment. They hung off zip wires, insulted minority groups, and revelled in the controversies and shock they created.
Their media obsession meant their governments became an unending series of headline-grabbing stunts. Johnson drove a tractor through a polystyrene wall to show he’d get Brexit done. Berlusconi personally signed a contract with the Italian people on live TV, offering a five-point manifesto, and promised that he’d resign if he achieved fewer than four (reader, he didn’t achieve them, and he didn’t resign).
The problem was that the media spectacle became a replacement for actually doing anything. Announcements replaced policies, and words replaced action. This was made worse by crises, the great crash for Berlusconi in 2008 and COVID for Johnson 2020. Both events called for leaders with seriousness, attention to detail and decisiveness, the opposite of what Berlusconi and Johnson had to offer.
The Tory contest has so far been a rather unedifying scrap for the remains of the party, similarly strong on positioning and headlines. The familiar rightwing touchstones of culture wars, immigration and Brexit, show candidates still fighting the last election and not addressing the new politics. They’ve focused on leaving the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) rather than the cost of living.
Badenoch recently said “real politics and real leadership is about showing the way and getting other people to follow you” but did this by firmly expressing support for Elon Musk, something that puts her at odds both with the public and her own party membership. It’s hard to imagine that her latest remarks about maternity leave being too generous could win her any public support either.
Any cleanskins in the building?
Personality politics often proves a double edged sword. When a politician places themselves centre-stage, they garner all the attention. But that inevitably means attention on any misdeeds as well as any triumphs.
Berlusconi came to power in 1994 with a whole string of controversies behind him. In fact it was said he aimed for political office, like Trump in 2024, mainly to avoid jail.
Berlusconi’s scandals rapidly gathered momentum, revealing a toxic mix of personal, political and financial impropriety which has its own, very long, Wikipedia page involving (deep breath) “trials and allegations of abuse of office, bribery and corruption of police officers, judges and politicians, collusion, defamation, embezzlement, extortion, false accounting, mafia, money laundering, perjury, tax fraud”.
Johnson, too, brought a string of controversies into Downing Street, including in relation to his personal life and how he funded his lifestyle, as well as Partygate.
Once in power, questions, investigations and inquiries into integrity rolled around their premierships and slowly came to dominate. Their popularity and polling plunged with each lurid revelation causing loyal supporters to distance themselves from the chaos.
It appears the Conservative candidates have not heeded this lesson. Each has sought to personalise their leadership credentials. This has merely drawn attention to scandals, from Jenrick’s questionable housing deals to offensive comments Cleverly made about sexual assault. It’s not clear that Cleverly’s admission that he talks too much, made by way of excuse for what he said, is really a helpful trait for a future party leader.
The four candidates have seemingly avoided any reflection on the reasons for the Conservatives’ catastrophic election loss in July. There a few signs that any of them realises the need to produce a credible and united opposition party by moving towards the centre.
Berlusconi and Johnson started from far stronger positions than these four but even they soon found their coalitions – both of voters outside parliament and MPs within – were too fragile to hold. Increasingly uneasy partners and supporters lost faith with both leaders over their corruption and inaction, as the weak electoral alliances that supported them came under pressure.
Whoever inherits the Conservative leadership must have plenty of allies across the many fractures that divide the defeated party. Johnson, and then Liz Truss, had rather shallow levels of support and soon found that unhappy parties can be disloyal and quick to revolt.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.