A ‘Long War’ Is Not the Answer to Israel’s Security Problem — and Could Lead to Destruction (PART TWO)

To read part one of this article, click here.

There are those who exhibit a romantic nostalgia for the hardships suffered by the founders of the state in the War of Independence — back then, we stood alone, the few against many. But after the first ceasefire in the War of Independence, the young IDF was able to strengthen itself and stand in an equal and even better power position than the armies of Egypt and the forces from the north. Note, by the way, that the IDF was largely unable to repel the Jordanian army, which was well equipped and organized.

Although Israel won the war of liberation, it did not even approach the defeat of its enemies and the achievement of complete victory. Determination and faith are important in war but do not guarantee military achievements. Embrace the difficulties of the past if you wish, but don’t expect those difficulties to somehow ensure success.

Ideology is also involved in the attempt to change the security concept. The Israeli right wing does not believe in reaching an agreement with the Palestinians, and is not interested in a binational state. To avoid a resolution is necessarily to choose endless war. According to Minister Bezalel Smotritch, Israel needs a security concept that entails a continuous war against the Palestinians until they are defeated. To this ideological way of thinking, endless war is justified if it has the purpose of eliminating the Palestinian threat to Israel.

In the Iron Swords War, the political leadership defined a goal that is impossible according to Ben-Gurion’s security concept, and the IDF set out to achieve that goal without a plan, a time frame, or the proper means in place. The IDF embarked on the Iron Swords War without a clear vision of what it was trying to achieve militarily, how long it would take, and what means it had at its disposal. A military plan must be based on resources that you know you have. You must never plan on unspecified quantities of capabilities, equipment, and time that are not already available to you.

Hezbollah’s entry into the war, which will occur in the manner chosen by Nasrallah, illustrates the absurdity of the way the Iron Swords War is being conducted. The entire northern region has been evacuated and abandoned indefinitely because the IDF is invested in Gaza and cannot allocate the necessary resources to protect the north.

What will Israel’s strategic situation be if the war in Gaza ends with a hostage agreement but without the Hamas regime having been “deported to Tunis”? Hamas (and the rest of Israel’s enemies) will be jubilant in their victory at having both achieved the release of Palestinian prisoners and survived to tell the tale. Will the price paid by Gaza, and perhaps the prevention of Gaza’s rehabilitation as long as Hamas is in power, be enough to reposition Israel as a regional military power?

Is a new concept of security — one in which every external threat is to be fought by war until its elimination — really required? The elimination of Hamas has not yet been achieved, and Israel has been at war with it for 10 months. How much time, armament, and military equipment will it take to eliminate Hezbollah? And after Hezbollah, what will prevent the forces supported by Iran in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen from continuing to fight? What will their military elimination look like? And what will move Iran to partner up with Abraham Accords?

According to the new concept, it is not possible to rely on deterrence because it always fails. There is also no point in short wars that do not completely eliminate the enemy. But if the goal of war is complete victory, it is mandatory to build a force that can support such an effort. How many days of war should the warehouses be prepared for? Weeks, months, or years?

If it is to enter a new “long war” era, the IDF will have to prepare and equip forces for wars that last years. Will the Israeli economy be able to withstand this? Will it be able to support “the largest army in the Middle East” (like after the Yom Kippur War)? Will the society that carries the economy on its back and serves in the reserves tolerate this? Will Israel continue to be a center of attraction for investors under such an economic structure? Will Israel’s enemies mount another attack like October 7 or just wait for the fruits of the Ben-Gurion concept to collapse? Israel’s “miracle” can be destroyed from within. Israel may have a well-equipped army, but what will happen to the country that relies on it?

In order to avoid ending the discussion on a vague statement that the concept of a long war for total victory and complete elimination of the threat is impossible and unrealistic, we will examine what Israel can still do according to the old concept.

If the Iron Swords War had been conducted according to the security concept, the following strategy could, for the sake of illustration, have been devised in October:

1. The IDF will be satisfied with severely hitting Hamas, not the entire territory of the Gaza Strip, while creating a completely demilitarized area in the north of the Gaza Strip. That area will later become the basis for the establishment of an alternative government.
2. Israel will arrive early at an agreement to free the abductees. This will be at the heavy price of releasing murderers and will allow the survival of some Hamas leaders, but will also allow for the design of a new border area and an obstacle that provides security for the returning residents of the surrounding communities.
3. As a result of these measures, Israel will maintain international support and perhaps even become a partner in a regional coalition with Saudi Arabia.
4. The IDF will be left with enough potential to fight Hezbollah — so much so that war might be prevented and an arrangement might be made that allows the residents of the north to return home.

True, this solution does not describe a complete victory, and Hamas would continue to exist. But the conditions would have been created for the establishment of an alternative government, at least in the north of the Gaza Strip, in an area that would begin to recover while the southern part of the Strip remains in ruins. It is possible that the IDF would have had to engage in another round of war in the southern Gaza Strip, but that is Israel’s fate. That is the way it was, and that is the way it will continue to be. The Hamas regime would have probably crumbled in half-destroyed Gaza, and the situation in the southern Gaza Strip would have provided Israel with deterrence at least until the next round.

It could have been a short war, just another round, but one that allowed a return to normality that made it possible to restore and recover.

The last 10 months have made clear that great pain does not confer desired abilities that did not previously exist. Israel is an island nation based on a reserve army. A long war is not a solution to a security problem. It is not possible to achieve complete victory, but we may well achieve complete failure if we pursue victory for too long without considering the limitations on our power, economy, and society.

Col. (res.) Gur Laish served as head of the campaign planning department in the Israel Air Force and as head of the security concept division at the National Security Council. He has a master’s degree in political science from the University of Haifa. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

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